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REVIVING JACOB AND YOUNGS, INC. v. KENT: MATERIAL 
BREACH DOCTRINE RECONSIDERED 
AMY B. COHEN* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
" A THEN parties enter into a contract, they come with hopes and 
V V fears. Their hopes are that the contract will go smoothly: that 
they will be able to perform exactly as they promised and that the 
other party will be able to perform as it promised. On the other 
hand, most people who enter into contracts are realistic enough 
also to have fears. They fear that they have failed to plan properly 
or that some event will occur that will prevent them from perform­
ing properly. They also fear that the other party will face some ob­
stacle or for reasons of bad faith fail to perform as promised. l 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. BA. 1974, 
Connecticut College; J.D. 1978, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank my col­
league, Francis J. Mootz, III, for his assistance and suggestions during the prepara­
tion of this Article. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Western 
New England College School of Law for supporting this project with a research 
grant. As always, I am grateful to my husband, Harvey M. Shrage, for his help in 
everything I do. 
1. See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L. 
REv. 861, 865 (1990) (discussing expectation interest). Professors Burton and An­
dersen describe contract formation stating: 
At the formation of an enforceable contract, the parties typically expect 
themselves and their contract partners to do what they promised to do. 
When that expectation is reasonable, because grounded-in the world of 
the contract, it provides a good reason for a party to change position in 
advance of performance by action or inaction. The expectation, how­
ever, may be disappointed for a variety of familiar reasons, including mis­
takes, misunderstandings, changed circumstances, and misplaced trust. 
Id.; see also Arthur I. Rosett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the Obliga­
tion to Communicate, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1083, 1087 (1975) (discussing basic contract 
structure). The contract demands that each party do what he or she promised. Id. 
Breach results when one party fails to do what he or she promised thereby negat­
ing the expectations of the nonbreaching party. Id. The consequence is that the 
breaching party may be required to pay money damages to provide the nonbreach­
ing party with the financial equivalent of performance. Id. Therefore, the expec­
tation interest "defines the harm that is the distinctive ... concern of contract." 
Burton & Andersen, supra, at 865. Accordingly, the prime goal of judicial reme­
dies for breach of contract is to compensate for harm to this expectation interest. 
Id. 
See, e.g., L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1,46 YALE LJ. 52, 57 (1936) (discussing legal protection of expectation 
interest). A breach by one party causes a sense of injury in the other party. Id. 
This feeling of injury is not limited, however, to cases where the promisee has 
relied on the promise. Id. "Whether or not he has actually changed his position 
because of the promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such that 
(65) 
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In making the agreement that will govern their performance, 
parties may draft clauses to address these fears, such as escape 
clauses that will excuse the party from performing in the event of a 
particular contingency or clauses conditioning one party's obliga­
tion on the other party's performance.2 In many instances, how­
ever, the parties may not be so particular; some contracts, after all, 
are very informal, even unwritten. Even where the parties draft a 
formal contract, they may be unwilling or unable to plan for every 
fear, every obstacle.3 Whether the parties have planned for it spe­
cifically or not, when something goes wrong, the parties' hopes are 
dashed and the agreement, no matter how carefully planned, is 
often an inadequate tool for handling the parties' problems.4 
What is the proper role of the law in such instances? How 
should such disputes be resolved and how should the legal system 
accomplish that resolution? In particular, how should the law re­
spond when one party fails to perform as it promised based on its 
a breach of the promise causes him to feel that he has been 'deprived' of some­
thing which was ·his ... · Id. (emphasis added). 
2. See Burton & Andersen, sUfrra note 1, at 872 (discussing express condi­
tions). Certain contract terms have the effect of making certain rights or remedies 
contingent on an event or condition. Id. For instance, parties to a contract can 
make the contract's enforcement a contingent part of their bargain. Id. They may 
agree that certain acts or omissions by one party will enable the other party to 
cancel the agreement. Id. In addition, they may also agree that certain specified 
behavior will result in specific consequences. Id. These terms represent or create 
conditions. Id. at n.42; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1979) 
(defining condition as "an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its 
non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due"). 
3. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 
CORNELL L. REv. 617, 627 (1983) [hereinafter Hillman, Analysis of Cessation] ("Con­
tracting parties may fail to consider and plan for contingencies that will arise be­
cause of the limitations of the human mind and imagination in anticipating the 
future .... "); see also Rosett, sUfrra note 1, at 1084 ("[The] expectations [of the 
parties] are rarely thought through. and inherent limitations on the process of 
drafting agreements make it certain they will be incompletely and imperfectly ex­
pressed. "). In addition, changes in outside circumstances constantly effect con­
tractual relations, "however firmly the parties may appear to be holding to their 
original course." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Rela­
tions Under Classica~ Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 
874 (1978). Professors Goetz and Scott, borrowing from Professor Macneil. use 
the term "relational contracts" to describe agreements in which "the parties are 
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obliga­
tions." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott. Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REv. 1089, 1090 n.4 (1981). 
4. See, e.g .• Hillman, Analysis of Cessation, sUfrra note 3. at 628-29 (discussing 
judicial supplementation of freedom of contract). For example, the overall cir­
cumstances taken together with the contract terms may not make it clear whether 
an agreement is terminable at will or for cause or whether a particular breach 
entitles the nonbreacher to cease performance. Id. at 629. In situations such as 
these, courts heavily rely on fairness norms. Id. 
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belief that the other party has breached its obligation under the 
contract? In other words, should the law entitle one party to be 
excused from performing simply because the other party has failed 
to perform all or part of its obligations under the contract? 
Under current common law principles, the answer to the ques­
tion is "Yes, sometimes." If the breaching party has committed a 
"material breach," then the nonbreaching party is entitled to sus­
pend its own performance, and assuming a showing of the breach­
ing party's inability to cure in a timely way, the nonbreaching party 
can even terminate or cancel the entire contract.5 If, however, the 
breaching party has substantially performed and thus has not mate­
rially breached, then the nonbreaching party may not stop perform­
ing, but must continue to perform or else find itself exposed to 
possible liability for its breach of contract.6 
Determining whether a material breach has occurred under 
current law involves a weighing of several factors, a determination 
that often seems either completely without logic or precision, or 
self-evident and conclusory. Thus, parties are left not knowing what 
to do and what risks they may be assuming. The problem with the 
current application of material breach doctrine is in large part a 
result of an absence of focus. The courts apply the test without 
articulating any foundation or context on which it is based. As dis­
cussed below, the law in this area could be much improved if courts 
would return to Judge Cardozo's opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. 
Kent. 7 In Jacob & Youngs, Judge Cardozo defined the foundation 
5. SeeWilJiamj. Geller, Note, The Problem of Withholding in Response to Breach: A 
Proposal to Minimize Risk in Continuing Contracts, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 163, 166-67 
(1993) (discussing constructive conditions and material breach). When a party 
fails to perform substantially the contract when such performance is due, that 
party has committed a material breach. Id. at 167. Because the constructive condi­
tion of performance has not occurred, the injured party has the right to cancel the 
contract and terminate any remaining obligations. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF CONTRACfS § 237 reporter's note, § 242 cmt. a (stating that material 
breach merely allows injured party to suspend performance). The approach of the 
Second Restatement allows the breaching party to cure the breach until enough 
time has passed that cancellation is warranted. Id.; see also 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACfS §§ 8.15, 8.18, at 435, 447 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing 
this approach). 
6. See Geller, supra note 5, at 168 (discussing substantial performance). When 
substantial performance has been rendered and the constructive condition has 
been satisfied, the breach of contract is not material. Id. When this occurs, the 
nonbreaching party does not have the right to cancel the contract. Id. He or she 
may, however, sue for damages for the nonmaterial breach. Id.; see also RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 237 cmts. a, d (discussing effect of material and 
nonmaterial breach). For a discussion of material breach, see infra notes 35-84 
and accompanying text. 
7. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
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and the context which can provide courts with the appropriate fo­
cus to use in deciding cases of material breach.8 
This Article will thus critique and suggest a modification of ma­
terial breach doctrine based largely on Judge Cardozo's reasoning 
in Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. Kent. Part II begins with a discussion of 
express conditions and then outlines the common law doctrine of 
constructive conditions and material breach and demonstrates how 
it is intended to apply.9 Part II also describes Judge Cardozo's opin­
ion in Jacob & Youngs and how the drafters of the Second Restate­
ment of Contracts attempted to incorporate that approach in their 
definition of material breach. Io Part III then illustrates how the 
courts have failed to use material breach doctrine to address suc­
cessfully the problems it is intended to resolve. ll Part IV examines 
the writings of some of those who have also studied this area and 
critiques the models those scholars have proposed for improving 
the law that governs such disputes. I2 Part IV also explores the struc­
ture of these disputes and the policy goals the law should be striving 
to accomplish once such disputes arise. I3 Part V proposes a change 
in the law to accomplish those goals. I4 Finally, Part VI concludes 
that a change in the law would promote good faith contract per­
formance and independent resolution of contract disputes. I5 
8. For a discussion of Judge Cardozo's opinion inJacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 
see infra notes 3M9. 
9. For a further discussion of express conditions, see infra notes 16-27 and 
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the common law doctrines of con­
structive conditions and material breach, see infra notes 28-35 and accompanying 
text. 
10. For a further discussion of Judge Cardozo's opinion inJacob & Youngs and 
the Second Restatement's position on material breach, see infra notes 36-55 and 
accompanying text. 
11. For a further discussion of misapplication of the material breach doctrine, 
see infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text. 
12. For a further discussion of the critiques and models of constructive condi­
tions and material breach by other commentators, see infra notes 85-124 and ac­
companying text. 
13. For a further discussion of the policy goals behind the doctrines of con­
structive conditions and material breach, see infra notes 85-124 and accompanying 
text. 
14. For a further discussion of this Article's proposal to accomplish the goals 
behind constructive conditions and material breach doctrines, see infra notes 126-
43 and accompanying text. 
15. For a further discussion of how to promote good faith contract perform­
ance and independent resolution of contract disputes, see infra notes 144-49 and 
accompanying text. 
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II. THE LAw OF CONDITIONS AND BREACH 
A. Express Conditions 
As stated above, parties entering into contracts hope that the 
intended exchange of performances will go as promised by both 
parties. I6 Each party, however, also fears that something will go 
wrong. Whether expressed or not, the parties have concerns about 
the consequences of the other party's failure to perform. When 
those concerns are expressed in the contract between the parties, 
the parties assume that the contract terms will govern any problems 
that arise. Thus, if the contract provides that an employee's re­
peated absences will be grounds for termination, the employer as­
sumes that he or she will have a right to terminate the employee if 
that employee is repeatedly absent. If a contract provides that a 
contractor's delay in construction will result in a termination of the 
contract, the owner assumes that he or she will have a right to ter­
mination if the contractor fails to perform as promised. 
The law generally provides that if express conditions are not 
satisfied as provided for in the contract, then the party whose per­
formance is so conditioned will be excused from its obligations to 
perform.!' As defined in section 224 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts: "[a] condition is an event, not certain to occur, which 
must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before perform­
ance under a contract becomes due."Is Williston defined the effect 
of a condition as follows: "A condition in a promise limits the un­
dertaking of the promisor to perform, either by confining the un­
dertaking to the case where the condition happens, or to the case 
where it does not happen."19 As further provided in section 225 of 
16. For a discussion of the parties' "expectation interest," see supra notes 1-4. 
17. See Hillman, Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 620 (discussing express 
conditions in context of cessation). When parties have clearly assigned the right of 
cessation, courts will generally enforce the agreement. [d. By doing so, courts are 
holding that "freedom of private parties to order their own affairs maximizes their 
welfare, and that of society." [d. (footnote omitted); see also Union Tank Car Co. v. 
Lindsay Soft Water Corp., 257 F. Supp. 510 (D. Neb. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Heator 
Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1967) (termination 
based on franchisee's failure to satisfy expressly stated minimum sales volume). 
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1979). 
19. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 663, at 125 
(3d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of conditions in contract law, 
see 3A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 627-631, at 11-22 (1960); 2 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 563 (2d ed. 1990). Corbin asserts that there is 
no single, correct definition for the term "condition." 3A CORBIN, supra,§ 627, at 
11. To avoid misunderstanding and inexact thinking in others, Corbin states that 
the word "condition," as used in his work, is defined as "an operative fact, one on 
which the existence of some particular legal relation depends." [d. 
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the &statement (Second) of Contracts: "[p]erfonnance of a duty sub­
ject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs 
or its non-occurrence is excused. "20 
Thus, if a contract makes an obligation expressly conditional 
upon the occurrence of an event, then that obligation will not be­
come due if that event does not occur. For example, in Luttinger v. 
Rosen,21 the court excused a buyer from its obligation to buy real 
property as promised in a contract where the obligation was condi­
tioned on the buyer's ability to obtain a bank mortgage for a de­
fined tenn of years at a defined interest rate. 22 The buyer was 
unable to obtain such bank financing, and even though the seller 
agreed to provide essentially equivalent financing, the court al­
lowed the buyer to enforce the condition as expressly provided in 
its contract and to have its deposit refunded.23 As the court 
observed: 
If the condition precedent is not fulfilled the contract is 
not enforceable. In this case the language of the contract 
is unambiguous and clearly indicates that the parties in­
tended that the purchase of defendants' premises be con­
ditioned on the obtaining by plaintiffs of a mortgage as 
specified in the contract.24 
Thus, failure to satisfy an express condition will relieve the other 
party's obligation to perfonn.25 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1); see 3A CORBIN, supra note 
19, § 655, at 142 ("If a fact or event is a condition precedent to a promisor's duty 
to render the performance promised, its absence or non-occurrence is a 'defense' 
in an action brought against him for breach of his promise."); 2 FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 5, § 8.3, at 569-74 (discussing effects of nonoccurrence of condition). 
21. 316 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1972). 
22. [d. at 758. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. (citations omitted). 
25. See Otis Elevator Co. v. George Washington Hotel Corp., 27 F.3d 903, 909 
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding party's failure to comply with notice provision to prevent 
automatic contract renewal in time required did not satisfy such condition and 
resulted in automatic renewal, even though late notice did not prejudice other 
party); Brown-Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1369 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (holding substantial performance of minimal annual rental income 
condition to bank financing obligation was insufficient to hold condition satisfied; 
strict compliance required of express, as opposed to constructive, conditions); 
MXL Indus. v. Mulder, 623 N.E.2d 369, 374-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (discussing 
Strict compliance and substantial performance and holding express condition for 
early termination by lessee of lease required strict compliance; substantial perform­
ance doctrine held inapplicable); Della Ratta v. American Better Community Dev., 
Inc., 380 A.2d 627, 637-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (holding express condition 
requiring building permits before contractor is obligated to commence work must 
be complied with strictly; substantial performance doctrine not applicable); see also 
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In many instances, however, courts will disregard the express 
language of the contract and hold that even though a condition has 
not been satisfied, its occurrence has been excused and thus, the 
other party is not discharged from performing. In finding that the 
occurrence of a condition has been excused, the courts rely on sev­
eral different doctrines. For example, as discussed in comment b to 
section 225 of the Second Restatement: 
The non-occurrence of a condition may be excused on a 
variety of grounds. It may be excused by a subsequent 
promise, even without consideration, to perform the duty 
in spite of the non-occurrence of the condition .... It may 
be excused by acceptance of performance in spite of the 
non-occurrence of the condition, or by rejection following 
its non-occurrence accompanied by an inadequate state­
ment of reasons. It may be excused by repudiation of the 
conditional duty or by a manifestation of an inability to 
perform it. It may be excused by prevention or hindrance 
of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. And it may be excused by 
impracticability.26 
Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding 
district court erred in charging jury that substantial performance would satisfy ex­
press condition because there must be strict compliance with express condition), 
modified, 813 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1987); Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp., 600 A.2d 
448, 452-53 (N.H. 1991) (involving buyer who failed to comply with deadline for 
notifying seller of unsatisfactory inspection report; court applied rule of strict com­
pliance of express condition and held buyer to obligations under contract, reason­
ing that "when ... parties expressly condition ... upon the occurrence or non­
occurrence of an event, rather than simply including the event as one of the gen­
eral terms of the contract, the parties' bargained-for expectation of strict compli­
ance should be given effect"). 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. b (1979); see Roberts 
Oil Co., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 222, 226-27 (N.M. 1992) (remand­
ing case with instruction that insured's violation of express contractual condition 
prohibiting voluntary payments will be excused if insurer is not substantially 
prejudiced by violation); Red River Commodities v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 805,809-
10 (N.D. 1990) (holding failure to comply strictly with express condition requiring 
written notice by certified mail of any "act of God" causing shortfall in crop pro­
duction excused where party received oral notification of shortfall); if. Hardin, 
Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 628, 633-
34 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff did not waive condition by conduct where it 
continued to inquire about defendant's ability to satisfy condition). See generally 3A 
CORBIN, supra note 19, §§ 752-771, at 478-560 (discussing elimination of conditions 
by waiver or prevention); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 8.5-8.6, at 586-95 (stating 
conditions may be excused by waiver or by other parties' breach that causes nonoc­
currence of condition); 5 WILLISTON, supra note 19, §§ 676-811, at 219-903 (dis­
cussing excuses for nonperformance of condition); Burton & Andersen, supra note 
1, at 872-75 (discussing and citing cases on enforcement of express conditions); see 
also Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Common Law 
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Thus, even where the parties by their own agreement have made an 
obligation conditional upon the occurrence of some specified 
event, the courts may apply one of the "excuse" doctrines to over­
ride the express terms of the contract and enforce the obligation in 
spite of the nonoccurrence of the condition.27 
Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. 
REv. 553, 563 (1976) [hereinafter Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together] (discussing 
harsh results of strict application of material breach doctrine). 
In addition, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229 provides that a condition 
may be excused in order to avoid a forfeiture: "To the extent that the non-occur­
rence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse 
the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of 
the agreed exchange." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229; see 2 FARNS­
WORTH, supra note 5, § 8.7, at 384 (discussing impracticability as excuse and dispro­
portionate forfeiture). As discussed in comment b to § 229, "'forfeiture' is used to 
refer to the denial of compensation that results when the obligee loses his right to 
the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially, as by preparation or per­
formance on the expectation of the exchange." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON­
TRACTS, § 229 cmt. b. Thus, for example, if a builder has already purchased 
supplies and substantially completed construction, there might be a disproportion­
ate forfeiture suffered by that builder if the owner could invoke the nonoccur­
rence of a condition, for example, the failure to comply with some minor aspect of 
the contract specifications, as a basis for avoiding its contractual obligation to pay 
the builder for the work already done. See American Ins. Co. v. C.S. McCrossan, 
Inc., 829 F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding express condition regarding ap­
proval of premium computation by third party excused to prevent forfeiture); 
Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 199 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(noting express condition regarding effect of late payment may be excused to pre­
vent forfeiture); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 222-24 (Conn. 
1988) (holding insured's failure to comply with timely notice condition in insur­
ance contract did not automatically discharge insurer, given contract of adhesion 
and forfeiture to insured, as long as insured can show no material prejudice to 
insurer); Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1026-27 (Wyo. 1988) (holding 
condition, requiring one contractor to inform other of specifications before incur­
ring expenses, excused, in part to prevent forfeiture). 
27. See Hillman, Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 633-34 (observing that 
courts will disregard express conditions in situations that would otherwise violate 
certain "fairness" norms such as unconscionability and forfeiture); see also UHS­
Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 756 (Miss. 
1987) (interpreting termination clause allowing termination for any failure to per­
form any material term of contract as allowing termination only for material breach 
of any material term because court considered any other reading to "produce 
harsh, unreasonable, expensive and unintended consequences"). 
Despite the traditional maxim of contract law that express conditions will be 
strictly enforced, courts use a variety of techniques for circumventing them. See 
Burton & Andersen, supra note I, at 872 (arguing that express conditions often are 
not strictly enforced). Thus, courts have lessened the freedom to contract by sub­
jecting express conditions and provisions to unconscionability tests and other re­
lated doctrines such as forfeiture, good faith and public policy. See Hillman, 
Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 621 & n.25 (discussing unconscionability and 
related doctrines in context of express right of cessation provisions). Unconscio­
nability generally encompasses unequal bargaining position or bargaining miscon­
duct, including fraud, duress and the duty to disclose. [d. Although courts are 
generally reluctant to override express contract provisions, "they have intervened 
on unconscionability and related grounds to ensure some degree of balance in the 
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B. Constructive Conditions 
Not all conditions, however, are created by the express agree­
ment of the parties. Some conditions are supplied by the courts in 
circumstances where "the parties have omitted a term that is essen­
tial to a determination of their rights and duties."28 For example, 
an employment contract may not specify when the obligation to pay 
for services rendered will be excused; it may simply describe the 
obligations of the employee and the compensation to be paid. If 
the employee fails to perform as promised, the employer may assert 
that its obligation to pay was conditioned on the employee's per­
formance of those contractual obligations, even though the con­
tract does not so specify. Historically, the common law provided 
that in such an instance, the promises of the employer were in­
dependent of the obligations of the employee and that the em­
ployer had no right to terminate or to withhold pay.29 Then, in the 
historic case of Kingston v. Preston,30 Lord Mansfield laid the 
fruits of the exchange." Id. at 622. See generally, Robert Childres, Conditions in the 
Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.V. L. REv. 33 (1970) (documenting failure of courts to 
enforce strictly express conditions with any consistency). 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c. The Second Restate­
ment states that "[a]n event may be made a condition either by the agreement of 
the parties ar by a term supplied by the court." Id. § 226 (emphasis added). Therefore, 
when parties have omitted a term that is essential to a determination of their rights 
and duties, a term, which is reasonable under the circumstances, may be supplied 
by the court. Id. This supplied term is a constructive condition. Id. 
Corbin notes that courts may hold that a constructive condition is required, 
even if the parties had no intention that the fact or event should operate as such 
and did nothing from which such an inference can be drawn. 3A CORBIN, supra 
note 19, § 632, at 22. "It is operative as a condition for the reason that courts have 
held or will hold it so on grounds of justice that are independent of expressed 
intention." Id. 
29. See 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 654, at 163 (discussing history of implied 
and constructive conditions); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.9, at 398 (surveying 
cases involving implied and constructive conditions); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, 
§ 816, at 28 (discussing original independence of mutual promises); Clinton W. 
Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Droelopment of Contract Law in 
Sroenteenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 35, 102-09 (1983) (discussing the 
notion of mutual promises). 
Williston states that: "It was settled law for centuries that mutual promises un­
less containing express conditions were independent. This had certainly become 
established as to mutual covenants by the year 1500 and probably earlier, and re­
mained unquestioned law both as to covenants and simple contracts until the 
eighteenth century." 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 816, at 28. Therefore, prior to 
the recognition of bilateral contracts, failure by a promisor to perform his or her 
promise did not affect the other party's duty. See 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 654, 
at 136 (discussing history of implied and constructive conditions). 
30. 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773). The report of this case which is commonly 
relied on appears in the argument of counsel in Jones v. Barkley, 99 Eng. Rep. 434 
(K.B.1781). See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.9, at 398-403 (discussing Kingston 
further); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 817, at 29-30 (same). 
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groundwork for the eventual development of the doctrines of sub­
stantial performance and material breach.31 By reading into the 
contract a condition where the parties themselves had not ex­
pressed one, Lord Mansfield recognized that parties have a general 
expectation of the interdependence of their performance 
obligations.32 
Based on this expectation, the courts and later the drafters of 
the Restatements of Contracts developed the doctrine of construc­
tive conditions and material breach as we know it today. Returning 
to our hypothetical employment agreement, if the contract itself 
did not specify that the employer's obligation to pay was condi­
tioned on the employee's performance of its contractual obliga­
tions, the court will probably provide that missing term, i.e., it will 
construe the employee's performance obligations as conditions to 
the employer's obligation to pay, creating what the Second Restate­
ment calls a "constructive condition."33 
31. Williston notes that even after 200 years, the principles set forth in King­
ston v. Preston still represent the law. 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 817, at 30. 
32. In Kingston, a silk mercer and his apprentice made a contract which pro­
vided that after one year and a quarter, the mercer was to convey the business to 
the apprentice and a partner. Kingston, 99 Eng. Rep. at 437. In return, the ap­
prentice was to pay for his share of the business in monthly installments and to 
assure these payments, give "good and sufficient security." Id. The apprentice 
sued the mercer for failure to convey the business, and the mercer defended by 
alleging that the apprentice had not given the required security. Id. The appren­
tice argued that the mercer's promise to convey was independent of his promise to 
give security. !d. Lord Mansfield rejected this argument and held for the defend­
ant mercer. Id. at 438. Lord Mansfield stated that there were instances where one 
promise under a bilateral contract was dependent on a return promise and in such 
cases nonperformance of the return promise was an excuse for the nonperform­
ance of the first promise. Id. Under Lord Mansfield's approach, the court deter­
mines whether a promise by one of the parties is dependent upon the other's 
return promise. Id. If it is, the court then supplies a term that makes the first 
party's promise conditional on performance of the return promise. Id. 
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c ("When the parties 
have omitted a term that is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, 
the court may supply a term which is reasonable under the circumstances. [Such 
terms are] often described as ·"constructive.'" (citation omitted»; see also 3A 
CORBIN, supra note 19, § 653, at 132 ("A constructive condition has been defined as 
a fact or event that is operative as such on grounds of fairness and justice, even 
though the parties expressed no intention whatever."); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 
5, § 8.9, at 398 ("Constructive conditions of exchange play an essential role in 
assuring parties to a bilateral contract that they will actually receive the perform­
ance that they have been promised."); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 825, at 57-60 
(criticizing fiction of "implied intent" to create dependent promises and uses term 
"constructive conditions imposed by law" as better reflecting the reality behind 
such dependency). See generally Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Con­
tracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 907-28 (1942) (discussing constructive conditions). 
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As the Second Restatement obseIVes, however, courts may treat 
a constructive condition differently from a condition expressly pro­
vided for by the parties-
[T]o the extent that the parties have, by a term of their 
agreement, clearly made an event a condition, they can be 
confident that a court will ordinarily feel constrained 
strictly to apply that term, while the same court may re­
gard itself as having considerable latitude in tailoring a 
similar term that it has itself supplied.34 
This latitude is reflected in the doctrine of material breach. 
C. Material Breach 
The doctrine of material breach is based on the law's willing­
ness to construe, as a term of all contracts, that "it is a condition of 
each party's remaining duties to render performances to be ex­
changed under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured 
material failure by the other party to render any such performance 
due at an earlier time."35 In other words, if one party has commit­
ted a "material failure" to perform its already due contractual obli­
gations, the other party can assert that its own contractual 
obligations have not become due; the breaching party's obligation 
to perform is thus construed by the courts as a condition to the 
other party's obligation to perform. In more concrete terms, the 
obligation of the employer to pay the employee in our hypothetical 
contract is constructively conditioned on the employee's perform­
ance of its obligations under the contract. The court's latitude in 
applying this constructive condition lies in its determination of 
whether or not the party's failure to perform is "material," that is, is 
it serious enough to excuse the other party from performing? 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c; cf. Brees v. Cramer, 
586 A.2d 1284, 1287-89 (Md. 1991) (refusing to construe husband's promise to 
name wife as beneficiary of life insurance policy in separation agreement as con­
structive condition to wife's promise to waive her rights to any interest in hus­
band's estate, based on presumed intent and public policy). See generally MXL 
Indus. v. Mulder, 623 N.E.2d 369, 374-76 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining differ­
ence between express conditions, which require strict compliance, and construc­
tive conditions, which are satisfied by substantial performance); Della Ratta v. 
American Better Community Dev., Inc., 380 A.2d 627, 637-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1977) (explaining and distinguishing constructive condition doctrine from express 
conditions); Northeast Custom Homes, Inc. v. Howell, 553 A.2d 387, 389-90 (NJ.· 
Super. 1988) (distinguishing process of "construction," in which court supplies 
terms, from process of "interpretation" in which court simply interprets); Heinrich 
v. R.L. Oil & Gas Co., 442 N.w.2d 467, 471 (S.D. 1989) (supplying constructive 
condition requiring seller to cooperate with buyer in obtaining financing). 
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237. 
HeinOnline -- 42 Vill. L. Rev. 75 1997
 
76 VILlANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 65 
1. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent 
In his well-known opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,S6 
Judge Cardozo provided much of the analytic framework for deter­
mining when a failure to perform is serious enough to excuse the 
other party from performing. InJacob & Youngs, the plaintiffs were 
builders hired by the defendant to build an expensive home.s7 De­
fendant refused to pay the plaintiffs the final amount due on the 
contract, asserting that plaintiffs had installed a brand of pipe other 
than that specified in the contract.S8 Plaintiffs sued for payment of 
the amount owed, claiming that the pipes installed were equivalent 
in quality to those called for in the contract.S9 The trial court re­
fused to admit evidence with respect to this equivalence and, on the 
basis of the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the contractual specifi­
cations with respect to the pipes, directed a verdict in favor of the 
defendant.40 Mter the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi­
sion reversed and granted a new trial, the defendant appealed to 
the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Divi­
sion and ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.41 
Writing for the majority, Judge Cardozo explored the distinc­
tion between dependent and independent promises and observed 
that some promises, "though dependent and thus conditions when 
there is departure in point of substance, will be viewed as independ­
ent and collateral when the departure is insignificant."42 In other 
words, where a failure to perform a promise is substantial, that 
promise will be construed as a condition to the other party's obliga­
tions. On the other hand, where the failure is insubstantial, the 
promise will be construed as independent and not a condition of 
the other party's obligation to perform. The more difficult ques­
tion for Judge Cardozo is how to determine when a particular fail­
ure to perform is significant enough to render that promise 
dependent: 
Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable 
intention are to tell us whether this or that promise shall 
be placed in one class or in another. The simple and the 
uniform will call for different remedies from the multifari-
36. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
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ous and the intricate. . . . There will be harshness some­
times and oppression in the implication of a condition 
when the thing upon which labor has been expended is 
incapable of surrender because united to the land, and 
equity and reason in the implication of a like condition 
when the subject-matter, if defective, is in shape to be 
returned.43 
77 
Thus, Judge Cardozo recognized that notions of equity and forfei­
ture must be considered in determining whether a failure to per­
form should excuse the other party. If the breaching party will 
suffer a forfeiture because its defective work cannot be returned, it 
would be less fair to excuse the nonbreaching party than where the 
nonbreaching party can return to the breaching party the defective 
goods. As Kent could not return the pipes already installed into his 
house to the builders, Judge Cardozo would weigh that factor 
against Kent in determining if the builders had materially 
breached. 
Judge Cardozo also believed that the reasonable expectations 
of the nonbreaching party must be weighed in such determina­
tions: "Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold 
in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something else is 
in view, it must not be left to implication. There will be no assump­
tion of a purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive retribution."44 
In other words, if a party intends to make a trivial defect by the 
other party enough to excuse itself from performing, it had better 
expressly state that in its contract. Otherwise, the law will assume 
that the intention was that only significant defects in the breaching 
party's performance will excuse the nonbreaching party from per­
forming. Judge Cardozo observed that "[w]here the line is to be 
drawn between the important and the trivial cannot be settled by a 
formula."45 He recognized that this question must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, looking to promote justice based on the rea­
sonable expectations of the parties.46 
One situation, however, where Judge Cardozo concluded some 
limits could be stated was that involving an intentional breach: 
"The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgres­
sion. For him there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor of implied 
43. [d. at 890-91. 
44. [d. at 891. 
45. [d. 
46. See id. (stating "[t]he question is one of degree ... to be answered by the 
triers of the facts"). 
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conditions. The transgressor whose default is unintentional and 
trivial may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his 
wrong."47 The moral tone of this language is unmistakable. Car­
dozo believed that in addition to concerns of fairness, the court 
should consider the conduct of the breaching party: was he or she 
operating in good faith? Although Cardozo does not explain what 
he means by a "willful transgressor," he made it clear that the inten­
tions of that transgressor were an important factor to consider.48 
In sum,Judge Cardozo outlined three basic factors that should 
inform decisions about whether a breach is trivial or significant 
enough to excuse the nonbreaching party from performing. These 
factors are the degree of harm to the breaching party, in particular, 
the possibility that that party will suffer inequitable forfeiture if the 
contract is terminated; the degree of harm caused by the breach to 
the reasonable expectations of the nonbreaching party; and good 
faith.49 
2. The Restatement Definition oj Material Breach 
The same factors discussed by Judge Cardozo inJacob & Youngs 
were incorporated into the Restatement (Second) oj Contracts defini­
tion of a "material" failure to perform. The Second Restatement 
defined a "material failure" in section 241: 
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer per­
formance is material, the following circumstances are 
significant: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be de­
prived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be ade­
quately compensated for the part of that benefit of which 
he will be deprived; 
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform 
or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or 
to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of 
all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances; 
47. Id. (citations omitted). 
48. See id. (stating "[w]e must weigh ... the excuse for deviation from the 
letter"). 
49. See id. (listing factors as purpose to be served, desire to be gratified, ex­
cuse for deviation and cruelty of enforced adherence). 
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(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party fail­
ing to perform or to offer to perform comports with stan­
dards of good faith and fair dealing. 50 
79 
As in Jacob & Youngs, the Second Restatement thus calls for consid­
eration of the degree of harm caused by the breach to the reason­
able expectations of the nonbreaching party (factors (a) and (b»; 
the degree of harm to the breaching party if the contract is termi­
nated (factor (c»; and the good faith of the breaching party (fac­
tors (d) and (e».51 
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979). A number of courts 
have applied § 241 of the Second Restatement. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. 
Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding breach of confidentiality 
clause in patent agreement was material, discharging plaintiff from obligations 
under contract), overruled by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 
F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (denying motion for summary judgment on issue 
of material breach); O'Connell Management Co. v. Carlyle-XIII Managers, Inc., 
765 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding genuine issue of material fact ex­
isted as to whether building manager materially breached by informing potential 
tenant of suitable space in other buildings and as to whether breach was curable 
and cured); Jafari v. Wally Findlay Galleries, 741 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(finding purchaser's failure to tender payment for painting by deadline was mate­
rial breach, discharging seller from any obligation under contract); Tyro Indus., 
Inc. v. Trevose Constr. Co., 737 F. Supp. 856, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding failure 
to maintain liability insurance was material breach of contract, entitling contractor 
to terminate); Conam Alaska v. Bell Lavalin, Inc., 842 P.2d 148, 159 (Alaska 1992) 
(affirming jury verdict that breach was not material); Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 
1220, 1223 (N.H. 1993) (affirming trial court's determination that party's failure 
to tender payment was not material breach). 
51. The doctrine of substantial performance views problems of failure to per­
form from a different angle, but with the same underlying concerns. According to 
this parallel doctrine, if a party substantially performs its contractual obligations, 
the other party is not excused from performing. For a discussion of substantial 
performance, see 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, §§ 700-712, at 308-51 (discussing sub­
stantial performance, its character and effect); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.12, 
at 414 (same); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 842, at 165-71 (same). It is sometimes 
said that substantial performance doctrine is the flip side of material breach doc­
trine: If a party substantially performs, that party has not committed a material 
breach; on the other hand, if a party has not substantially performed, then it has 
committed a material breach. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.16, at 442 ("The 
doctrine of material breach is simply the converse of the doctrine of substantial 
performance."); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 842, at 165-66 (arriving at same con­
clusion). Determinations of substantial performance consider many factors similar 
to those used in determinations of material breach: the extent of nonperformance, 
the extent to which the nonbreaching party has been denied the benefits of the 
contract, the willfulness of the breach and the extent to which the nonbreaching 
party can be compensated in damages. See generaUy 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, 
§§ 704-707, at 318-31 (discussing factors considered when determining material 
breach); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.12, at 414-22 (same). Similar to determi­
nations of material breach, determinations of substantial performance are fact­
based and not easily predicted. As Corbin said: 
It is not easy to lay down rules for determining what amounts to "substan­
tial performance" ... in any particular case. It is always a question of fact, 
a matter of degree. a question that must be determined relatively to all 
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Assuming that the failure to perform is a material one, the Sec­
ond Restatement provides that the nonbreaching party is entitled 
initially to suspend or withhold performance of its contractual obli­
gations. If, however, that failure to perform remains uncured, the 
obligations of the nonbreaching party may be discharged com­
pletely.52 Section 242 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
provides: 
In determining the time after which a party's uncured ma­
terial failure to render or to offer performance discharges 
the other party's remaining duties to render performance 
under the rules stated in [sections] 237 and 238, the fol­
lowing circumstances are significant: 
(a) those stated in [section] 241; 
(b) the extent to which it reasonably appears to the 
injured party that delay may prevent or hinder him in 
making reasonable substitute arrangements; 
the other complex factors that exist in every instance. The variation in 
these factors is such that generalization is difficult and the use of cases as 
precedents is dangerous. 
3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 704, at 318-19. 
Given the essential identity of the two doctrines, the discussion herein of "ma­
terial breach" doctrine and its flaws applies as well to "substantial performance" 
doctrine. 
52. Corbin used different terminology; he distinguished between "total 
breach" and "partial breach": 
A total breach ... is a non-performance of duty that is so material and 
important as to justify the injured party in regarding the whole transac­
tion as at an end .... A total breach by A will usually terminate B's duty 
to perform any further on his part, but it does not always do so. 
4 CORBIN, supra note 19, § 946, at 809. In contrast, "[a] partial breach by one party 
... does not justify the other party's subsequent failure to perform; both parties 
may be guilty of breaches, each having a right to damages." Id. at 811 (footnote 
omitted). Corbin recognized that the courts often use other terminology: "not 
infrequently the term material breach is used to mean one that the injured party 
can elect to treat as a total breach." Id. at 813 (footnote omitted). Williston also 
distinguished between "partial" and "total" breach. 11 WILLISTON, supra note 19, 
§ 1292, at 8-11 (stating that slight breach may not excuse injured party from per­
formance). Farnsworth uses the term "material breach" to refer to the circum­
stances which justify a party in suspending its own performance, as in § 241 of the 
Second Restatement. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 8.15-8.18, at 435-55. The 
Second Restatement uses the terms "total breach" and "partial breach" to distin­
guish between different ways of calculating contract damages. RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF CONTRACfS § 236. The Second Restatement uses the term "uncured 
material failure" to describe the circumstances which determine whether or not a 
nonbreaching party is excused from performance. See id. § 237 ("[I]t is a condi­
tion of each party's remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged 
under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the 
other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time."). 
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(c) the extent to which the agreement provides for 
performance without delay, but a material failure to per­
form or to offer to perform on a stated day does not of 
itself discharge the other party's remaining duties unless 
the circumstances, including the language of the agree­
ment, indicate that performance or an offer to perform by 
that day is important.53 
81 
Thus, if the breaching party's failure is a material one, as defined in 
section 241, and that failure remains uncured for a period of time 
beyond that allowed by the intent of the contract or for a period of 
time which hinders the ability of the nonbreaching party to find a 
reasonable substitute, then not only can the nonbreaching party 
withhold performance of its contractual obligations temporarily, it 
can withhold performance permanently. In other words, it can 
"cancel" or "terminate" the entire contract.54 For example, if the 
employee's material failure to perform as promised remains un­
cured beyond a reasonable time as determined under section 242, 
the employer will be discharged from paying that employee under 
the terms of the contract. 
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242. There are very few cases 
expressly relying on or interpreting § 242. Compare Commonwealth Petroleum Co. 
v. Billings, 759 P.2d 736, 738-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (determining, for purposes 
of right to terminate under § 242, whether time was of essence in contract for 
assignment of lease, required consideration of number of factors resulting in find­
ing that time was not of essence), with Garcia v. Alfonso, 490 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding time was of essence and contract properly termi­
nated where buyers did not obtain financing until three weeks after 3O-day period 
specified in contract had expired). For a critical discussion of § 242 and its incor­
poration of the opportunity to cure a material failure to perform, see William H. 
Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: An 
Analytical Comparison with the Unifarm Commercial Code, 70 MINN. L. REv. 713, 723-24, 
735-36 (1986). 
54. Farnsworth uses the word "terminate" to describe the right of the non­
breaching party to "put an end to the contract" after an uncured material failure 
to perform. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.18, at 447. Others also use this termi­
nology. See, e.g., Rosett, supra note 1, at 1086 (noting that after material breach, 
nonbreaching party may be justified in terminating his or her own performance). 
Some commentators instead describe this right as a right to "cancel" the contract. 
See, e.g., Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 
V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073, 1075 (1988) (noting that under VCC nonbreaching party 
"is entitled to 'cancel' the contract"). The drafters of the Second Restatement 
described the effect of an uncured material failure to perform as a "discharge" of 
the remaining duties of the nonbreaching parties. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC 
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (discussing determination of dischargeability of remain­
ing duties). All these different terms reflect the same underlying concept: At 
some point a nonbreaching party has a right to claim that it no longer has any 
obligation to perform its duties under the contract. 
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The rights of the parties thus depend greatly on whether or 
not a particular failure to perform is a material failure, or as usually 
referred to by the courts, whether or not it is a material breach. 
Unfortunately, as the cases reveal, instead of focusing onJudge Car­
dozo's three principal concerns, the courts have often become en­
tangled in the various factors outlined in section 241 and have not 
provided clear discussion of why a particular breach is or is not con­
sidered material. This unfocused case law has made it extremely 
difficult to determine whether or not a particular failure is. 
material. 55 
55. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is interesting to note that 
similar problems exist with respect to the doctrine of anticipatory breach. 
Whereas material breach doctrine deals with a failure to perform contractual obli­
gations that have become due, anticipatory breach doctrine deals with the 
problems created where one party indicates, by words or conduct, that it will not or 
cannot perform contractual obligations that are not yet due. The doctrinal re­
sponse to this problem is in some ways similar to the response to problems of 
material breach. An anticipatory breach is held to discharge the non breaching 
party's obligations to perform any duties remaining under its contract. "Where 
performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, one party's 
repudiation of a duty to render performance discharges the other party's remain­
ing duties to render performance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 253(2}. See generally 6 CORBIN, supra note 19, §§ 1255, 1259-1260, at 21-22, 31-38; 
2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 8.20-8.23, at 466-92; 11 WILLISTON, supra note 19, 
§§ 1300-1312, at 76-110. That is, as with a material breach that remains uncured, 
an anticipatory breach entitles the nonbreaching party to suspend and ultimately 
terminate its obligation under the contract. 
As with the doctrine of material breach, however, there is considerable diffi­
culty in knowing for certain whether a party has, in fact, committed an anticipatory 
breach. First of all, "the threatened breach ... must be serious enough that the 
injured party could treat it as total if it occurred." 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, 
§ 8.21, at 474-75 (footnote omitted). In addition, in order to find that the party 
has anticipatorily breached the contract, one must consider the words and/or con­
duct used to create the impression of an intention not to perform as promised. 
Thus, as Farnsworth describes it, "[t]he statement must be sufficiently positive to 
be reasonably understood as meaning that the breach will actually occur. A party's 
expressions of doubt as to its willingness or ability to perform do not constitute a 
repudiation." [d. § 8.21, at 475 (footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. b ("In order to constitute a repudiation, a party's language 
must be sufficiently positive to be reasonably interpreted to mean that the party 
will not or cannot perform. Mere expression of doubt as to his willingness or abil­
ity to perform is not enough to constitute a repudiation .... "). See generally 2 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.21, at 474-75 ("For repudiation to have legal effect, 
the threatened breach must be serious .... [E]xpressions of doubt ... do not 
constitute repudiation."). A contract can be repudiated by conduct only if the 
party has voluntarily acted in a way that makes its performance of its contractual 
obligation impossible. Delay or unwillingness reflected in conduct is not enough. 
See id. § 8.21, at 479; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. c 
("In order to constitute a repudiation, a party's act must be both voluntary and 
affirmative, and must make it actually or apparently impossible for him to per­
form."); 4 CORBIN, supra note 19, § 954, at 829 (surveying breach by repudiation). 
Obviously, such standards require the nonbreaching party to weigh and interpret 
the statements and/or conduct before deciding to suspend its own performance. 
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III. MATERIAL BREACH CAsE LAW: A MUDDLED APPROACH 
Professor Eric G. Andersen provided a very thorough evalua­
tion of the way courts have relied on section 241 to determine mate­
rial breach.56 Professor Andersen asserted that the Second 
Restatement factors have failed to provide a coherent or meaning­
ful approach to determining a material failure. According to Pro­
fessor Andersen, "the Restatement factors fall seriously short of 
providing a workable definition of materiality."57 He asserted that 
the Second Restatement provides no "underlying, unifying princi­
ple more specific than 'fairness' or )ustice'" to use in determining 
how to weigh or balance the various factors.58 Professor Andersen 
An incorrect assessment of the other party's intent or ability to perform can lead to 
liability if the nonbreaching party withholds its performance. 
56. See Andersen, supra note 54, at 1089-92 (analyzing judicial application of 
§ 241). 
57. Id. at 1083 (noting that most obvious failing of Second Restatement fac­
tors is absence of any guidance on their relative priorities or how to combine 
them). 
58. Id. Andersen reviewed the ways that the courts have treated the § 241 
factors in many decided cases. He argued that the first factor, "the extent to which 
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected," 
which is apparently intended to consider the gravity of the nonperformance, is 
unhelpful because it provides no substantive content to determine that gravity. Id. 
at 1085. 
He argued that the second factor, "the extent to which the injured party can 
be adequately compensated for the part of the benefit of which he will be de­
prived," is an inappropriate factor for determining material breach because its fo­
cus is on the need for certainty in recovering compensatory damages. Id. The 
courts and the Second Restatement comments appear to consider a breach more 
likely to be "material" and thus relieving the nonbreaching party of its contractual 
obligations when the non breaching party would have difficulty proving the actual 
damages caused by that breach with the degree of certainty which contract law 
requires. As Andersen points out, if the certainty requirement is itself justified as a 
matter of contract law, "it is not clear why cancellation should be available in place 
of damages when the requirement is not satisfied." Id. at 1085-86. In other words, 
the provability of actual damages caused by a breach should not be relevant to 
determining whether or not the breach itself is a material one. 
The third factor, "the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer 
to perform will suffer forfeiture," Andersen considered relevant, but not as a factor 
for determining the materiality of the breach itself. Andersen argued that the 
question of materiality should focus on the impact of the breach on the non­
breaching party, not the effect of cancellation on the breaching party. Id. at 1087. 
He would consider forfeiture as a relevant factor in determining the breaching 
party's right to restitution and the extent of the nonbreaching party's right to with­
hold its own performance, but not as a factor in determining materiality and thus 
the basic right of the nonbreaching party to suspend or withhold its performance. 
Id. at 1111-22. 
With respect to the fourth § 241 factor, "the likelihood that the party failing to 
perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure," Andersen believed that this 
should be a factor considered in determining material breach, but claimed that 
without some explanatory framework to explain the doctrine of material breach, it 
is not possible for the courts to consider this factor appropriately. Id. at 1087. 
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then discussed the ways that the courts have dealt with this flawed 
set of factors, and he concluded that the courts either cite the fac­
tors and disregard them, or rely on one or more factors without a 
thorough or satisfying analysis of those factors. Thus, Professor An­
dersen concluded that the doctrine of material breach, as defined 
in section 241 and as applied by the courts, is so riddled with ambi­
guity and imprecision that it fails to provide parties to the contract 
with sufficient guidance for determining whether or not a particu­
lar failure to perform will be considered materia1.59 
A look at some recent cases applying the doctrine of material 
breach illustrates some of these flaws in the material breach doc­
trine. For example, Stone Forest Industries, Inc. v. United State§,O illus­
trates the arbitrariness and uncertainty of material breach doctrine. 
In this case, the United States Forest Service had entered into a 
contract with the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff was allowed to re­
move timber from land in a national forest in exchange for pay­
ment.61 The plaintiff had made certain advance deposits and then 
was denied access to some of the land covered by the contract. The 
plaintiff requested a return of a portion of its deposits, and the For­
est Service refused to return the entire amount requested.62 After 
finding that the Forest Service had in fact denied the plaintiff ac­
cess to 15.89% of the land covered by the contract, the court con­
cluded that this amounted to a material breach of the contract, 
entitling the plaintiff to a return of the portion of that amount of its 
Finally, regarding the fifth § 241 factor, "the extent to which the behavior of 
the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with the standards of 
good faith and fair dealing," Andersen asserted that while the state of mind of the 
breaching party may be a relevant factor to consider in determining the materiality 
of the breach, as phrased in § 241, this factor is meaningless, because "no general 
consensus exists about the meaning of that term and because of the lack of a gen­
eral theory of materiality within which good faith can operate." Id. at 1088. 
59. Id. at 1088-89; see also Lawrence, supra note 53, at 746 (criticizing "waver­
ing material breach standard" of Second Restatement because it causes uncer­
tainty); Rosett, supra note 1, at 1091-92 (difficulty in distinguishing between failure 
of condition which discharges performance obligations as opposed to one which 
merely suspends them leads to uncertainty for party deciding how to respond to 
such failure); Geller, supra note 5, at 181-92 (outlining various risks, situational 
and legal, that parties face when trying to determine how to respond to failure to 
perform by other party to contract). 
60. 973 F.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
61. Id. at 1549. Stone Forest Industries ("SFI") agreed to purchase, cut and 
remove 19,430 MBF (thousand board feet) of timber in the Klamath National For­
est in California. Id. The contract termination date of March 31, 1980 was ex­
tended several times, until the contract finally terminated on September 3, 1985. 
Id. On September 28, 1984, the California Wilderness Act was enacted. Id. This 
Act affected four of the 14 units of SFI's contract. Id. As a result, access was de­
nied to these four units. [d. 
62. Id. at 1550. 
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deposit representing the portion of land to which it was denied ac­
cess.63 The court distinguished the case from an earlier case, Everett 
Plywood Corp. v. United States,64 where the plaintiff was denied access 
to only 6.5% of the lumber covered by a contract with the Forest 
Service and no material breach was found.65 Although the Stone 
Forest court observed that "percentages alone are not always disposi­
tive,"66 it did not explain why a denial of access to 15.89% consti­
tuted a material breach, but a denial of access to 6.5% did not. 
Thus, the Forest Service in future cases might be led to assume that 
a material breach of a timber removal contract may be committed if 
they deny access to somewhere between 6.5% and 15.89% of the 
land covered by the contract. 
The uncertainty of material breach determinations and the 
risks created by that uncertainty is also illustrated by Health Related 
Services v. Golden Plains Convalescent Center,67 which involved plain­
tiff's ten-year contract to operate and manage defendant's nursing 
home. Mter the management company was acquired by a different 
corporation almost five years into the contract, the nursing home 
began to be dissatisfied with the manager's performance and at the 
end of the sixth year terminated its contract, alleging material fail­
ures to perform.68 The management company sued, seeking lost 
profits as damages, and the nursing home counterclaimed, alleging 
damages from the management company's unsatisfactory 
performance. 69 
At trial, the nursing home submitted evidence that the man­
agement company had paid vendor invoices late, had failed to ob­
tain Medicare reimbursements, had failed to supply payroll checks 
and had failed to staff the facility adequately.7o Although there was 
63. [d. at 1552. The court observed that the materiality of a breach is deter­
mined in light of the totality of events and circumstances. [d. (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmt. a (1974». It is incorrect, therefore, to "mea­
sure each contributing element separately and, finding it small, remove it from the 
equation." [d. 
64. 512 F.2d 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
65. Stone Farest, 973 F.2d at 1552. Significantly, the Everett court stated that the 
denial of access to only a portion of the lumber" 'neither defeated the whole pur­
pose of the contract nor deprived plaintiff of substantially all it had bargained 
for.'" [d. (quoting Everett, 512 F.2d at 1093-94). 
66. [d. In stating that the percentages alone are not dispositive, the Stone Far­
est court cited, with approval, the Second Restatement view that" 'it is impossible to 
lay down a rule that can be applied with mathematical exactness.'" [d. (quoting 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275 cmt. a (1932». 
67. 806 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
68. [d. at 103-04. 
69. [d. at 104. 
70. [d. at 105. 
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evidence that the management company had been responsive and 
had corrected some of the problems, there was also evidence that 
some problems had never been fully resolved. Even in the face of 
this evidence, the jury found for the management company and 
awarded damages.71 
The nursing home appealed, but the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals upheld the jury's verdict, saying only that: 
It is not every dissatisfaction with a contract performance, 
nor even every breach-but only a material breach-that 
excuses performance by the other party. The circum­
stances significant to that determination are given in Re­
statement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981) .... It is 
sufficient to say that, under those principles, neither the 
evidence nor the arguments [defendant] brings to bear, 
shows any [plaintiff] neglect that constitutes a material 
failure to perform under the contract.72 
The court never explained how section 241 should be applied to 
the evidence submitted or why the problems experienced by the 
nursing home were not sufficiently serious to justify termination of 
its contract with the management company.73 
Given this ambiguity and uncertainty in material breach deter­
minations, a nonbreaching party can expose itself to liability if it 
decides to suspend its own performance. For example, in the 
71. [d. at 106. 
72. [d. at 105 (citations omitted). 
73. The uncertainty of predicting whether or not a breach is material is not 
uncommon. See Eastern Ill. Trust & Say. Bank v. Sanders, 826 F.2d 615, 618-19 
(7th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's finding that bank's granting of addi­
tional side loans to borrower in breach of explicit term of guaranty agreement with 
Small Business Administration was not material breach); Sahadi v. Continental Ill. 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193,200 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court 
summary judgment on issue of materiality of breach because issue of materiality is 
factually complex); Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 1220, 1223 (N.H. 1993) (noting 
whether delay in payment is material breach is complex factual determination and 
holding timber buyers delay in payment was not material). 
Another indication of the uncertainty involved in determining material 
breach is that some courts are reluctant to issue summary judgment where mate­
rial breach has been alleged, treating the issue as a question of fact for the jury. 
See, e.g., Sahadi, 706 F.2d at 194 (reversing district court grant of summary judg­
ment holding material breach had occurred where lender tendered interest pay­
ment one day later in breach of express term of contract because of factual 
complexity regarding materiality); O'Connell Management Co. v. Carlyle-XIII 
Managers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 779, 784 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding summary judg­
ment inappropriate to determine material breach). But see Milner Hotels, Inc. v. 
Norfolk & Western Ry., 822 F. Supp. 341, 347 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (granting sum­
mary judgment because where facts not in dispute, material breach is question of 
law), affd, 19 F.3d 1429 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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Golden Plains case, the nursing home was held liable for terminating 
the management company after incorrectly concluding that its fail­
ings constituted a material breach. 
This phenomenon is further illustrated in McClain v. Kimbrough 
Construction CO.74 McClain, a brick mason, entered into a subcon­
tract with Kimbrough to do the brick work at a condominium pro­
ject for which Kimbrough was the general contractor.75 McClain 
had worked for three weeks, laying over 20,000 bricks, when it was 
forced to stop work so that Kimbrough could complete grading 
work. 76 By this time, however, Kimbrough had already discovered 
several problems with the brick work, and although McClain had 
attempted to make some corrections, Kimbrough decided never to 
call McClain back to the job after the grading was completed.77 In­
stead, Kimbrough contracted with a different brick mason to finish 
the job. 
McClain sued Kimbrough for breach of contract, and Kim­
brough counterclaimed for the increased costs it incurred as a re­
sult of having to replace portions of McClain's work. 78 The trial 
court ruled that Kimbrough had breached its contract with McClain 
and awarded damages accordingly; it also dismissed Kimbrough's 
counterclaim.79 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, holding 
that McClain's performance deficiencies did not constitute a mate­
rial breach, and therefore, that Kimbrough's failure to give Mc­
Clain notice and a reasonable opportunity to correct its work 
constituted a material breach of the contract by Kimbrough. 
The court observed: 
A party who has materially breached a contract is not enti­
tled to damages stemming from the other party's later ma­
terial breach of the same contract. Thus, in cases where 
both parties have not fully performed, it is necessary for 
the courts to determine which party is chargeable with the 
first uncured material breach.80 
The court then found that Kimbrough's failure to provide a suita­
ble place to work or a reasonable opportunity to perform and its 
74. 806 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). 
75. [d. at 196. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. at 196-97. 
78. [d. at 197. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 199 (citations omitted). 
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failure to give notice before terminating the contract preceded Mc­
Clain's failure to complete the job in a workmanlike manner.8 } 
Therefore, Kimbrough's breaches excused McClain's nonperform­
ance, and McClain's nonperformance thus did not prevent it from 
recovering damages from Kimbrough. 
To the extent material breach doctrine places such signifi­
cance on who committed the first material breach, as illustrated by 
this case and the Golden Plains case, it fails to treat contract disputes 
in a realistic or fair manner.82 As the cases indicate, all the parties 
to the contract may have contributed to the exacerbation of the 
dispute. Although one party may have made the first error in per­
formance, at some point it is fair to say that both parties have not 
fulfilled the promises they made in their contract. For example, in 
the McClain case, it appears to be hairsplitting to say that Kim­
brough materially breached first by failing to allow McClain to cor­
rect the problems with its work. This analysis is particularly 
arbitrary, because it is so difficult to say with any certainty whether a 
particular breach is material. To determine a party's rights by fo­
cusing on the chronological occurrence of problems that really may 
be occurring more or less simultaneously seems quite absurd and 
even unfair.83 
81. Id. 
82. See also Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 1220 (N.H. 1993) (demonstrating risks 
involved where one party suspends or terminates performance in response to what 
it believes is other party's material breach). In Fitz, the defendant had terminated 
its contract with plaintiff based on its belief that plaintiff had materially breached 
its contract by removing timber in an unworkman-like manner and tendering pay­
ments late. Id. at 1222. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and prevailed, 
based on the court's conclusion that the plaintiff'S breaches were not material. Id. 
The defendant was held liable to the plaintiff for its lost profits. Id. at 1223. 
83. See Geller, supra note 5, at 190 n.175. In this student Note on the problem 
of determining a party's right to withhold performance in response to the other 
party's failure to perform as promised, the author analogizes this approach to the 
parent who punishes the child "who started it." Id. According to the author, the 
court which tries to determine who committed the first material breach is like the 
parent who tries to determine which child escalated a dispute by going beyond the 
limits of trivial misbehavior and committing a punishable offense. Id. What this 
analogy illustrates with respect to material breach doctrine is what most parents 
learn when they try to determine "who started it." See id. In the end, that is not 
relevant, since at some point both children have contributed to and escalated the 
dispute. See id. A similar point can be made with respect to determining material 
breach in a contractual dispute. It should not necessarily matter who committed 
the first material breach if both parties have contributed to and escalated the 
dispute. 
See also 2401 Pennsylvania Ave. Corp. v. Federation of Jewish Agencies, 489 
A.2d 733 (Pa. 1985). In 2401 Pennsylvania Ave., the plaintiff, who was the owner of 
certain real estate, entered into a two-year lease agreement with the defendant to 
begin May 1, 1974. Id. at 734. The parties also agreed, however, that in the event 
that the current tenant did not vacate by May 1,1974, the plaintiff would have until 
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This chronological analysis has important practical significance 
for parties involved in a potential contract dispute. If a nonbreach­
ing party cannot be sure that the other party's failure to perform 
will be considered the first material breach, then that party will not 
know whether it is entitled to suspend or withhold its own perform­
ance. In fact, as in these cases, the nonbreaching party runs the 
risk of being held to have materially breached first if it suspends its 
performance or terminates the contract in response to what it 
thinks is the other's material breach. 
August 31, 1974, to make the premises available to the defendant. [d. at 734-35. 
As predicted, the current tenant was unable to vacate by May 1, 1974, and the 
defendant seemed to acquiesce to the delay. [d. In June 1974, however, the de­
fendant found a building in what it considered a better and less costly location and 
purchased it on July 1, 1974. [d. at 735. When the plaintiff's current tenant then 
requested an extension of its lease with the plaintiff beyond August 31, 1974, the 
plaintiff asked the defendant to approve its right to grant the further extension. 
[d. The defendant refused, claiming that the entire lease agreement was invalid 
due to the plaintiff's failure to deliver the premises by May 1, 1974, and that it 
therefore did not want to do anything to signify that it believed the lease was valid. 
[d. The plaintiff thereafter granted its current tenant the requested extension of 
its lease through October 31, 1974. [d. at 736. Nonetheless, the plaintiff sent the 
defendant a bill for October rent, which the defendant refused to pay. [d. The 
plaintiff then sued for anticipatory breach of contract. [d. The trial court awarded 
the plaintiff damages of $292,000, plus interest and the defendant appealed. [d. at 
734. 
Faced with this sad state of events, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court split 4-3. 
See id. at 738 (holding for defendant). The majority found that the defendant had 
not anticipatorily breached the lease. [d. at 737. Rather, the plaintiff's extension 
of its current tenant's lease beyond August 31, 1974, constituted a material breach 
of its lease with the defendant, excusing the defendant from any obligation to pay 
rent or other damages. [d. at 738. The majority focused on the fact that the de­
fendant had not unequivocally indicated a refusal to honor its obligation to pay 
rent under the lease. [d. at 737. 
Three judges dissented in two separate opinions, but all three would have 
held that the defendant did anticipatorily breach the lease by finding other prem­
ises and indicating that it had no intention to move into the plaintiff's building. 
[d. at 745 (Larsen, j., dissenting); id. at 747 (Hutchinson, j., dissenting). Judge 
Larsen further argued that even if the defendant had not committed an anticipa­
tory breach by finding other premises, the plaintiff still had not materially 
breached by extending the lease of its current tenant because the defendant had 
no intention of occupying the premises anyway. [d. at 746 (Larsen,]., dissenting). 
Thus the dissenters would have affirmed the trial court's judgment and the award 
of damages to the plaintiff. [d. at 747 (Larsen, J., dissenting). 
This series of events is symptomatic of the problems in many contract dis­
putes. The parties began with good intentions, hoping to have the premises avail­
able by May 1, but both recognized the possibility of delay and accepted that 
possibility. See id. at 735 (noting that plaintiff expressed these concerns in Novem­
ber 1973 letter to defendant). Then, one party, finding a better deal, wanted to 
back out of the lease and purported that the delay was its reason. [d. The plaintiff, 
claiming that the defendant had anticipatorily breached the contract by finding 
other premises, extended its current tenancy, but still sued the defendant for 
rental payments. [d. at 736. It appears that to some extent both parties were at 
fault, and yet each charged the other with responsibility for the mess they had both 
created. 
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This material breach doctrine, as currently applied, leaves par­
ties to contracts without predictable guidelines to follow in deter­
mining their conduct. By failing to discuss the actual basis for 
whether a breach is or is not material, the courts have not educated 
the parties as to what to expect from the law in such cases.84 By 
focusing on which side committed the first material breach, the 
courts have compounded the problem by protecting one party 
when that party may be just as responsible for the breakdown of the 
contract as the other party. Other scholars have proposed alterna­
tive models or approaches to the problems addressed by the mate­
rial breach doctrine. Although each of these has its merits, for 
reasons discussed below, none goes far enough. 
IV. THE GoALS OF MATERIAL BREACH DOCTRINE 
Before proposing possible solutions to the problems created by 
current material breach doctrine, it is important to consider the 
goals the law is seeking to accomplish through contract law and 
particularly through material breach doctrine. Possible goals of 
contract law include: completion of contractual obligations; eco­
nomic efficiency; protecting the expectation and reliance interests 
of the parties; and fairness and equity. All of these goals play some 
part in contract jurisprudence. 
With respect to material breach doctrine in particular, it is 
helpful to return to Judge Cardozo's opinion inJacob & Youngs, Inc. 
v. Kent.85 The goal here is not to ensure contract performance at 
all costs, nor is it primarily to promote economic efficiency. Rather, 
the purpose of determining if a breach is "material" is to decide 
whether it is reasonable for the nonbreaching party to be excused 
from its contractual obligations because of the other party's breach. 
84. See Andersen, supra note 54, at 1075 (noting that many courts that pur­
port to follow Restatement actually ignore it when time comes to decide materiality 
question and that other courts seem to pick and choose among stated factors with­
out justifying their choices); Rosett, supra note I, at 1081-82 (noting that despite 
several centuries of effort by legal scholars and jurists, traditional contract law pro­
vides no comprehensive set of principles to supply clear answers to central ques­
tions in most contract disputes regarding whether there has been performance, 
whether there has been brea~h and whether there has been discharge of obliga­
tion); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PIlT. L. REv. 75, 102-22 
(1984) (discussing how uncertainty about litigation outcomes in contract disputes 
can lead to inefficient breaches and discourage efficient breaches); Geller, supra 
note 5, at 164-65 (stating that courts have applied several different standards to 
determine whether withholding performance is proper and because of this, parties 
to continuing contracts face substantial risk when they make decisions concerning 
withholding following breach of contract). 
85. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). For a discussion of Judge Cardozo's opinion in 
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, see supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text. 
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In his article on material breach, Professor Andersen focused 
on one of Judge Cardozo's three factors: the degree of harm caused 
by the breach to the reasonable expectations of the nonbreaching 
party.86 As conceptualized by Professor Andersen, the doctrine of 
material breach must be understood as related to the remedies it 
triggers, that is, suspension and cancellation of contract obligations 
by the nonbreaching party.87 Professor Andersen described two in­
terests of the nonbreaching party that are at stake when the other 
party fails to perform as promised.88 One interest, as labeled by 
Professor Anders~n, is the interest in present performance, that is, 
the interest of the nonbreaching party in the performance obliga­
tions of the other party that have already become due.89 The other 
interest of the nonbreaching party is the interest in future perform­
ance, that is, the nonbreaching party's interest in the performance 
obligations of the other party that have yet to become due.90 
According to Professor Andersen, it is the interest of the non­
breaching party in future performance that the material breach 
doctrine is intended to protect and not the interest in present per­
formance.91 Professor Andersen argues that traditional contract 
damage remedies are sufficient to protect the nonbreaching party's 
interest in the obligations that have already become due and have 
not been fulfilled; the nonbreaching party does not need to sus­
pend or cancel its performance obligations to protect that inter­
est.92 On the other hand, where the nonbreaching party has 
serious concerns regarding the other party's willingness or ability to 
perform in the future, then the nonbreaching party may need to 
protect itself by suspending or even terminating its own perform­
ance.93 According to Professor Andersen, courts should determine 
86. Andersen, supra note 54, at 1092-1111. 
87. Id. at 1092 (explaining also that primary policy of remedies is to protect 
victim's expectation interest without imposing unnecessary costs on party in 
breach). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1092, 1095-1101. 
90. Id. at 1092, 1096-1101 (assuming contract is executory, or bilateral, and 
not unilateral where only one party has interest in future performance of other 
party). 
91. Id. at 1104-05 (noting that breach by anticipatory repudiation is "pure" 
example of material breach). 
92. Id. at 1095 (recognizing, however, that difficult issues may arise in connec­
tion with determining amount required to compensate for failure to perform 
properly or with decision to award specific relief rather than damages). 
93. See id. at 1096, 1106 (noting that security of whether other party will per­
form as agreed is one of primary benefits of contractual relationships and propos­
ing cancellation may be necessary to protect party's concern about future 
performance) . 
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whether a breach is material with this concern in mind.94 Only if 
the breach would raise concerns in the mind of the objectively rea­
sonable nonbreaching party about the breaching party's future per­
formance so that the cancellation remedy is necessary to protect 
the nonbreaching party's interest, should that breach be consid­
ered material. 95 
Professor Andersen's insights and analysis are very valuable. It 
is appropriate to link the doctrine of material breach with the rem­
edy it triggers. Professor Andersen's analysis focuses, however, too 
heavily on only one of the factors relevant to material breach deter­
minations: the harm caused by the breach to the reasonable expec­
tations of the nonbreaching party.96 According to Professor 
Andersen, if the non breaching party is reasonably concerned that 
those expectations will not be met, then the breach is material and 
the party may suspend performance.97 Professor Andersen's analy­
sis is flawed, however, to the extent that he fails to consider fully 
Judge Cardozo's other concerns: harm to the breaching party if the 
contract is not terminated and that party's good faith.98 
Professor Andersen did give some consideration to the effects 
of termination on the breaching party.99 He recognized that al­
lowing the nonbreaching party to terminate the contract based on 
its reasonable expectations could produce harsh results for the 
breaching party.IOO Thus, he recommended that the law protect at 
least the restitutionary interest of the breaching party, and in many 
instances the expectation interest as well, by requiring the non­
breaching party to compensate the breaching party for the work 
done before cancellation.101 In addition, Professor Andersen 
would limit the nonbreaching party's right to withhold moneys due 
under the contract to a reasonable amount by considering the 
94. [d. at 110~9. 
95. [d. at 1106. For additional discussion by Professor Burton on these ideas, 
see Burton & Anderson, supra note 1, at 870-72. 
96. Andersen, supra note 54, at 1095-1101. 
97. Id. at 1107. 
98. For a discussion of Judge Cardozo's concerns regarding material breach 
doctrine, see supra notes 3649 and accompanying text. 
99. Andersen, supra note 54, at 1111-23 (discussing protecting interests of 
breaching party and noting that although many jurisdictions grant restitution to 
defaulting plaintiff, measure of recovery may be unnecessarily miserly). 
100. [d. at 1112 (stating that routine element of conventional material breach 
analysis balances harm that breach caused victim against harm that cancellation 
would impose on breaching party). 
101. [d. at 1116-20 (concluding that this compensation implements policy 
that victim's expectation interest to be protected is at least cost to breaching 
party). 
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value of work already done by the breaching party.I02 In other 
words, while upholding the right of the nonbreaching party to can­
cel the contract in response to a material breach, Professor Ander­
sen would require the nonbreaching party to compensate the 
breaching party in order to prevent a result that is too harsh. lOS 
Other scholars have also recognized the need to provide some 
compensation to the breaching party. This view has often been ra­
tionalized on the basis of contract law's nonpunitive view of con­
tract breachers. lo4 Professor Robert A. Hillman stressed the 
economic and other benefits of encouraging parties to "hold the 
102. Id. at 1120-22 (noting, however, that limit will be "practicable only when 
the victim's performance consists of the payment of money or perhaps the transfer 
of some other divisible, fungible units of goods or services" and explaining that 
breaching party's interest will be subject to good faith of victim in determining 
reasonable estimate of damages). 
103. Id. at 1116-22. 
104. The nonpunitive view of contract breach is best reflected in the concept 
of efficient breach, i.e., the view that as long as the nonbreaching party is fully 
compensated and the breaching party is better off, a breach of contract should be 
encouraged, not discouraged, in order to promote the most efficient use of assets. 
See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 284-86 (1970) (discussing efficient breach the­
ory). Professor Birmingham argued that: 
Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is 
able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a 
position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered . 
. . . To penalize such adjustments through overcompensation of the in­
nocent party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community re­
sources. . . . Rigidity resulting from thus binding a party to his 
undertaking limits the factor and product mobility essential to proper 
functioning of the market mechanism. 
Id. at 284-85. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.8, at 
117-26 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing fundamental principles of contract damages and 
explaining that it makes difference in deciding which remedy to grant whether 
breach is efficient). 
This theory has been scrutinized by many scholars and has been convincingly 
criticized for its failure to account for the transaction costs involved in any contract 
dispute. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory 
Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443 (1980) (arguing that efficient 
breach model based on compensatory damages is flawed because it fails to con­
sider adequately transaction costs incurred in breach of contract, including rene­
gotiation and litigation as well as cost of undetected inefficient breaches, which 
add to costs without increasing quality of efficiency); Daniel Friedmann, The Effi­
cient Breach Fallacy, 18]. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (asserting that efficient breach the­
ory fails to consider transaction costs and other uncertainties which result from 
breach of contract and advantages in some situations of encouraging transactions 
between nonbreaching party and third party who has provided impetus for 
breach); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 
947,957 (1982) ("Whether an expectation damages rule or a specific performance 
rule is more efficient depends entirely upon the relative transaction costs of oper­
ating under the rules. . . . None of the transaction costs can be deduced by use of 
the microeconomic model, but can only be determined inductively from empirical 
evidence.") . 
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deal together."lo5 He discussed the law's attempt to balance the 
rights of the nonbreaching party with the goals of economic effi­
ciency and avoidance of waste. 106 As described by Professor Hill­
man, contract law seeks to avoid waste by enforcing rules of 
mitigation, that is, that the nonbreaching party cannot act in ways 
that will needlessly increase the damages caused by the breach of 
Others have gone beyond the flaws in the theory with respect to economics to 
criticize its failure to account for the moral value of keeping promises as well as the 
general societal benefits that flow from the ability to rely on others to live up to 
their promises. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Effi­
ciency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111 (1981) (arguing 
that theories of efficient breach fail to consider noncommercial and idiosyncratic 
values that people place on contract performance and ignore moral basis underly­
ing contracts and asserting that courts should instead rely on remedy of specific 
performance to promote fair and efficient results); Patricia H. Marschall, Willful­
ness: A Crucial Factqr in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 733 
(1982) (arguing that efficient breach theory is faulty and courts should not allow 
willful breacher to profit from his or her breach). Professor Marschall explained 
that: "Even if the theory of efficient breach were realistic, the values that support it 
are of less importance to society than the principle of good faith and fair dealing 
in the performance and enforcement of contracts." [d. at 734. Thus, Professor 
Marschall asserted that: "Courts ought to be putting more emphasis on the notion 
of sanctity of contract and the resulting moral obligation to honor one's 
promises." [d. at 740; see also RussellJ. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and 
Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1, 30-35 (finding in survey of corporate practice that there 
is substantial sentiment among corporate counsel that even in the absence of ac­
tual reliance, contractual commitment should be enforced). 
Professor Friedmann also questions the notion underlying the efficient 
breach theory that one has a right to breach a contract. Friedmann, supra, at 13-18. 
He asserts that throughout property and tort law, the law rejects this notion by 
protecting a party's entitlement to his or her property and the interests in it cre­
ated by contracts. [d.; see also Macneil, supra, at 961-69 (arguing that efficient 
breach theory ignores fact that party's entitlement to rewards of contract is not 
determined separately from remedy granted for breach of contract). Professor 
Macneil states that "there is no a priori basis for selecting any particular time or 
event for determining that the transaction is closed," and only then does the party 
have a new property right which may be protected by more than ordinary contract 
remedies. Id. at 964. 
Furthermore, others have pointed to and supported the increased willingness 
of courts to grant punitive damages for breach of contract. See, e.g., Marschall, 
supra, at 758-60 (determining that punitive damages should be used to deter willful 
breaches of contract); Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: 
The Reality and Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1977) (discussing 
judicial decisions that blurred distinction between tort and contract law in regard 
to punitive damages); Randy L. Sassaman, Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Ac­
tions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN LJ. 86, 104-05 (1980) 
(concluding that "better rule would allow punitive damages based on the quality of 
defendants' conduct, without regard to the rigid tort-contract dichotomy"). 
105. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 556-58 (noting that it 
has been suggested that contract breach penalties would deter contract formation 
and therefore would run counter to purposes of contract remedies) . 
. 106. [d. at 558-61 (discussing avoidable consequences doctrine). For a fur­
ther discussion of the avoidable consequences doctrine, see infra notes 107-11 and 
accompanying text. 
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contract. I07 The nonbreaching party is required to take steps to 
make substitute arrangements with third parties, when reasonable, 
that will reduce the damages caused by the breach; for example, a 
wrongfully discharged employee cannot sit idle and seek recovery 
of all lost wages if reasonably comparable work is available.108 Ac­
cording to Professor Hillman, such rules are desirable because they 
avoid economic waste. I09 
Professor Hillman would extend this notion of avoiding waste 
even further by requiring the nonbreaching party to accept a post­
breach modification offer from the breaching party in situations 
that will avoid harm to the breaching party without increasing the 
costs to the nonbreaching party. I 10 Thus, where there are no other 
reasonable substitutes for the nonbreaching party and the breach­
ing party's offer is reasonable and does not waive the nonbreaching 
party's rights to sue for the breach of the original contract, the non­
breaching party must accept the breaching party's offer under the 
rules of mitigation. II I Professor Hillman argues that to allow the 
nonbreaching party to reject such offers and to cancel the contract 
is inconsistent with the economic, nonpunitive view of contract 
law.112 He thus recognized that material breach doctrine, as cur-
107. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 558-59. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 559-61 (noting that mitigation rules should not conflict with expec­
tancy theory). Professor Hillman states that "the main purpose of the doctrine [of 
avoidable consequences] is to avoid economic waste which would result from the 
injured party suffering damages from the breach which could have been avoided 
by reasonable efforts." Id. 
110. Id. Hillman states: 
Under the rule of avoidable consequences, the injured party must, when 
reasonable, make substitute agreements with third parties to avoid loss 
from the breach. The extent to which the injured party must deal with 
the breaching party to avoid loss is less clear. ... In many instances it may 
be economically reasonable for the injured party to avoid waste by ac­
cepting a new offer made by the breaching party. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
111. Id. For a further discussion of the rule of avoidable consequences, see 
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. 
112. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 598-615. Professor 
Hillman also discussed the law's interest in balancing the harm to the breaching 
party in the event of termination with the harm to the nonbreaching party. Hill­
man, Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 634-37, 656-57. Other scholars have also 
focused on the need to provide the breaching party with an opportunity to cure 
the breach and on the need to protect the breaching party from unduly harsh 
consequences, such as forfeiture. See Lawrence, supra note 53, at 724-25 (stressing 
that providing breaching party with opportunity to cure its breach is best justified 
by "general contract remedial principles of protecting expectations and avoiding 
waste of resources, while also protecting the breaching party against forfeiture of 
its contract rights" (footnote omitted)). Professor Lawrence asserts that encourag­
ing the breaching party to cure its breach and the nonbreaching party to facilitate 
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rently applied, interferes with the goal of "holding the deal to­
gether" by allowing the non breaching party simply to terminate the 
contract in response to a material breach. 113 His view would con-
and accept that cure will most effectively promote society's interests in economic 
efficiency. See id. at 724-35 (encouraging avoidance of waste). He further ob­
serves, however, that although the Second Restatement incorporated the concept 
of cure by making only an uncured material failure a condition to the other party's 
duty to perform, the awkward drafting of § 237 makes it likely that courts will con­
tinue to neglect this notion of cure. Id. at 735-44; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 237 (1979) (discussing effect of other party's duties of failure to 
render performance). 
This view is also reflected in the approach of Article 2 of the Vniform Com­
mercial Code (VCC) to the problem of the seller's tender of nonconforming 
goods. For example, although a buyer is entitled to reject nonconforming goods, 
Article 2 requires the buyer to give notice to the seller of such rejection and re­
quires that the buyer reject within a reasonable time after tender or delivery of 
such nonconforming goods. V.C.C. §§ 2-601 (a), 2-602(1). In addition, and most 
significantly, Article 2 provides the seller with an opportunity to cure, i.e., to 
tender conforming goods. Id. § 2-508. Although there are limitations on this op­
portunity to cure, the VCC's drafters clearly intended to increase the likelihood 
that parties could resolve their own disputes without resorting to litigation by re­
quiring the buyer to provide the seller with notice of rejection and by allowing the 
seller some opportunity to cure the defect in its original tender. Thus, the drafters 
of the VCC wanted to encourage communications between the parties in order to 
facilitate independent resolution of such disputes. For a more complete discus­
sion of the VCC's treatment of problems of contract performance and breach, see 
Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 579-94; Lawrence, supra note 
53, at 718-20; John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation and Cure Under Article 2 o/the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Modest Proposals, 84 Nw. V. L. REv. 375, 376 (1990) 
(recommending revisions for Article 2). For a comparision of the VCC's perfect 
tender rule and the common law standard of substantial performance, see Ramirez 
v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1348-52 (NJ. 1982). 
As defined by Professor Richard Craswell, the most efficient termination rule 
is one that prevents a promisee from terminating the contract "whenever that 
promisee will be fully compensated if the promisor's attempt to perform should 
fail." Richard Craswell, Insecurity, Repudiation, and Cure, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 430 
(1990). Where such compensation is not certain, e.g., where the promisor is not 
solvent or where damages are too uncertain, then the promisee should be allowed 
to terminate the contract in response to a repudiation or breach by the promisor 
unless "(I) the promisee's uncertainty about the promisor's performance is no 
greater than it was when the original contract was signed,"-that is, where the 
promisee had information about the risks at the time it entered the contract-or 
"(2) even successful performance has become undesirable for the promisee,"­
that is, where the promisee's reasons for terminating are based on the fact that the 
contract, even iffully performed by the promisor, is no longer as valuable or desir­
able as originally assumed by the promisee. Id. In sum, Craswell recognizes that 
termination may sometimes be the most efficient alternative, but concludes that 
current rules based on material breach do not reflect the most appropriate rule for 
determining when termination will be efficient. Id. 
113. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 562-64. Hillman 
states: 'The material breach doctrine would lead to harsh results if an insignificant 
breach were interpreted to deprive the injured party of 'substantially what he bar­
gained for.'" Id. at 562. Hillman added that factors that should be considered in 
distinguishing a material breach from an immaterial breach normally help protect 
against harsh results where justice and common sense require. Id. at 563. "Never­
theless, the material breach doctrine often leads to unjust results." Id. 
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sider the hann to the breaching party by limiting the nonbreaching 
party's right of tennination in cases where the hann to the breach­
ing party if the contract is tenninated outweighs the hann to the 
nonbreaching party that is caused by the breach.1I4 
Professor Arthur 1. Rosett viewed this problem from a different 
perspective.1I5 He argued that the underlying problem with con­
tract law's treatment of the issues that arise in contract disputes is 
that the law has been shaped to guide courts rendering decisions in 
cases that have gone to litigation.116 Instead, according to Profes­
sor Rosett, contract law should attempt to guide the private parties 
to resolve those contract disputes by themselves.117 He asserts that 
"since the parties are in a better position than courts to detennine 
what to do, they would be best served by rules which encourage 
them to solve the problem themselves."1I8 For Professor Rosett, 
this would mean imposing a duty on the nonbreaching party to of­
fer the breaching party an opportunity to cure before a court would 
allow the discharge of the nonbreaching party's contractual obliga­
tions. II9 Such a duty, according to Professor Rosett, would increase 
the likelihood that the parties would resolve the matter 
themselves. 120 
What underlies Professors Hillman's and Rosett's views is a fun­
damental belief that society and the parties to contracts would ben­
efit from independent resolutions of contract disputes that do not 
involve the COUrts. I21 Moreover, there is an implicit, if not explicit, 
114. [d. 
115. Rosett, supra note I, at 1083-1102 (discussing contract performance and 
shortcomings of traditional theories of remedy). 
116. [d. at 1085. 
117. [d. at 1085, 1096-98. 
118. [d. at 1098. 
119. [d. at 1100. 
120. [d. at 1100-02 (making similar point regarding law's role in encouraging 
communications and independent resolutions of dispute after partial repudiation 
of contract); see also Arthur Rosett, Partial, Qualified and Equivocal Repudiation of 
Contract, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 93, 110 (1981) (trying to promote settlement without 
court intervention). 
121. See Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 614 n.269 (observ­
ing that "[c]ontracting parties seek to avoid litigation. Since the law should at­
tempt to formulate its rules in accordance with actual business practices, a policy 
that spurs settlement is desired." (citations omitted». Professor Hillman's obser­
vation was confirmed by Professor Weintraub in his survey of actual contract prac­
tice, in which he found that the overwhelming majority of respondents would 
grant a request for modification of a contract, especially if it was reasonable or if 
there was a satisfactory pre-existing relationship with the other party. Weintraub, 
supra note 104, at 18-21. The survey also showed that most companies had at some 
time requested a contractual modification from another party to a contract. [d. at 
22-24. Weintraub concluded that the survey demonstrated that "when trouble oc-
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assumption that disappointing the reasonable expectations of the 
nonbreaching party does not itself justify terminating the contract. 
The impact on the breaching party is also significant and must be 
considered, whether for reasons of economic efficiency, as articu­
lated by Professor Hillman, or for reasons of fairness and auton­
omy, as articulated by Professor Rosett.122 Thus, as had been 
identified by Judge Cardozo, the second factor that must be consid­
ered when determining material breach is the harshness of the ef­
fect that termination will have on the breaching party.123 A 
nonbreaching party's right to terminate in response to the breach­
ing party's failure to perform is not simply a function of the non­
breaching party's own disappointed expectations, but also is 
affected by the degree of harm that termination will inflict on the 
breaching party. 
A focus just on Judge Cardozo's first two factors could lead, 
however, to nothing more than a formulaic balancing test: Does the 
harm caused by the breach to the nonbreaching party's reasonable 
expectations outweigh the harm that will be suffered by the breach­
ing party if the contract is terminated? In order to avoid such a 
mechanical approach, it is necessary to incorporate Judge Car­
dozo's third factor into the analysis: good faith.124 It is that factor 
which seems critical and yet, is the one that courts have paid the 
least attention. 
V. THE SOLUTION: ACKNOWLEDGING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF 
GoOD FAITH 
When considering a possible improvement in the law of mate­
rial breach, it is first necessary to state certain assumptions about 
the way parties behave. We can assume that some disputes are 
curs respondents were more likely to experience accommodation and compromise 
than to become involved in litigation." [d. at 51-52 (citations omitted); see also 
Geller, supra note 5, at 198 (arguing that improved standard to determine propri­
ety of one party's withholding of payment upon another party's contractual breach 
should encourage parties to resolve their differences through communication, ne­
gotiation and settlement rather than through costly, risky process of litigation). 
122. For a discussion of Hillman's and Rosett's opinions, see supra notes 110-
20 and accompanying text. 
123. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) ("We 
must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for 
deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence." (emphasis added». 
124. See id. (explaining that "willful transgressor must accept the penalty of 
his transgression" while transgressor "whose default is unintentional and trivial 
may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong." (citations omitted». 
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"good faith" disputes and that some are "bad faith" disputes.125 
Professors Burton and Andersen assert that when parties enter a 
contract, their intentions and reasonable expectations define the 
parameters for their conduct in performing and enforcing the con­
tract.126 These intentions and expectations are considered by Bur­
ton and Andersen to create "the world of the contract." 127 
Determinations of breach then must be made based on the "world 
of the contract."128 A failure to perform as promised must be evalu­
ated based on whether it can be justified on the basis of this "world 
of the contract"; that is, on the basis of the intentions and reason­
able expectations of the parties as to what would justify a failure to 
perform. 129 
In the terminology used here, a "bad faith" dispute is one that 
is not based on the "world of the contract" because it conflicts with 
those actual intentions and expectations; a "good faith" dispute re­
flects the party's actual intentions and reasonable expectations.I30 
Where the parties both honestly believe that they are right, for ex-
125. V.C.C. § 1-201(19). The VCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned." Id. When concerning merchants, the 
VCC provides a definition of "good faith" to mean "honesty in fact and the obser­
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 2-
103(I)(b). 
126. Burton & Andersen, supra note 1, at 862-69. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 867-69. 
129. Id. at 862-69. 
130. See Steven]. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform 
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 385-87 (defining "good faith" as based on 
reasonable expectations of parties with respect to how each party would behave). 
Professor Burton also stated that: 
The good faith performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise 
of discretion for any purpose-including ordinary business purposes­
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. A contract would 
thus be breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its 
discretion for a reason outside the reasonable contemplated range-a 
reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
Burton further elaborated on this view in a subsequent article, asserting that: 
"The good faith performance doctrine is used to effectuate the intentions of the 
parties, or to protect their reasonable expectations, through interpretation and 
implication." Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply 
to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 497, 499 (1984). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the best ap­
proach for defining good faith, scholars have often discussed the concept of "good 
faith" and have developed differing views on how to define "good faith." For ex­
ample, Professor Robert Summers argued that it is best to define "good faith" by 
considering what conduct would not be good faith conduct. Robert S. Summers, 
"Good Faith n in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968). That is, he thought good faith should be 
defined by what it excludes: 
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ample, where Owner honestly believes he or she is entitled to the 
correct brand of pipe and really cares that this brand be used and 
Contractor honestly believes that the pipe used is correct and that 
any change would unfairly increase the cost of the contract, we have 
a "good faith" dispute. lSI On the other hand, if either party is act­
ing in bad faith, for example, if Owner is using the pipe problem as 
a pretext for harassing Contractor to extract some financial conces­
sion or to escape its contractual obligations,ls2 or if Contractor has 
It is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and 
serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a 
particular context the phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is 
only by way of contrast with the specific form of bad faith actually or 
hypothetically ruled out. 
Id. (footnote omitted). In a later article discussing § 205 of the Second Restate­
ment and its recognition that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement," Professor Sum­
mers again asserted the benefits of the "excluder" approach to defining "good 
faith." Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Con­
ceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 824 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979». He argued: 
My view is that all ... efforts [by other scholars] to define good faith, for 
purposes of a section like 205, are misguided. Such formulations provide 
very little, if any, definitional guidance .... Finally, the very idea of good 
faith, if! am right, is simply notthe kind of idea that is susceptible of such 
a definitional approach. 
Id. at 829-30. 
It would seem that the more the courts are forced to consider the concept of 
good faith, in the coritext of material breach decisions as well as in other aspects of 
contract formation and performance, the better will be our understanding of that 
concept and the best way to define it. 
131. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921) (discuss­
ing dispute over pipes). 
132. See, e.g., T. Ferguson Constr. v. Sealaska Corp., 820 P.2d 1058 (Alaska 1991) 
(illustrating issue of pretextual assertion of other party's material breach as justifi­
cation for one's own nonperformance). In that case, the plaintiff had entered into 
a road construction contract with the defendant, but immediately fell behind 
schedule due to its inadequate equipment and financial resources. Id. at 1058-59. 
Five months after entering the initial contract, the parties modified the construc­
tion contract to resolve certain disputes concerning the interpretation of the pay­
ment clause and to reflect that, to date, the defendant had paid the plaintiff more 
than it was owed. Id. at 1059. The modification also specified dates for payment 
of certain cash advances to plaintiff for work still to be done. Id. One month 
later, disputes arose again. Id. at 1059-60. The plaintiff called to ask if the defend­
ant had mailed the cash advance due that day, and although the defendant said 
that it had been mailed, the advance had not gone out due to a holiday. Id. at 
1059. There was also a disagreement regarding how much was owed. Id. at 1059-
60. On the following day, the defendant inspected the work sites, and finding that 
the plaintiff was not performing any work, decided to withhold payment. Id. at 
1060. The plaintiff then stopped work and sued the defendant for alleged breach 
based on the defendant's failure to make the payment that was allegedly due. Id. 
The trial court found that the defendant was not in breach and was excused 
from making further payment because it acted on the correct belief that the plain­
tiff was unable to perform. Id. at 1061-62. Rather, the trial court held that the 
plaintiff was in breach by its failure to perform after having not received payment 
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used the wrong pipe to save money, knowing that it was not what 
was the contract required, we have a "bad faith" dispute. 133 
AB the law currently stands, little, if any, express attention is 
paid to the good or bad faith nature of the breach. Although there 
is some scholarly support for the notion of deterring willful 
breaches134 and some weight placed on willfulness in some determi-
from the defendant. [d. at 1062. The trial court awarded damages to the defend­
ant in an amount that reflected payments made to the plaintiff in excess of work 
done, plus extra costs incurred by the defendant to complete the job. [d. at 1060 
n.6. 
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the factual findings of the 
trial court and its conclusion that defendant was justified to withhold the payment. 
[d. at 1061-62. Two judges dissented, asserting that the defendant had not with­
held the payment because of the inability or failure of the plaintiff to complete the 
job. [d. at 1063-64 (Matthews,J., dissenting). The dissent found evidence that the 
defendant had withheld payment for other reasons. [d. at 1064 (Matthews,]., dis­
senting). The dissent concluded: "Withholding of progress payments is justified 
only if the withholding party actually relies on the circumstances which clearly 
warrant that action." [d. (Matthews, J., dissenting). In other words, the dissent 
believed that the defendant was not motivated by plaintiffs failure to perform, but 
had other reasons for withholding, including the lapse of plaintiffs performance 
bonds and the fact that plaintiff would have owed defendant money if the progress 
payment had been made. [d. at 1064, n.1 (Matthews,]., dissenting); see also Com­
monwealth Petroleum Co. v. Billings, 759 P.2d 736, 740 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) 
(finding party's objection to form of assignment of lease to be "mere 'after­
thought' used improperly" to claim material breach and holding use of wrong 
form was not material breach). But see Refinement Int'l Co. v. Eastbourne N.V., 
815 F. Supp. 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Since [defendant] had the legal right to 
terminate its obligation under the contract, it is legally irrelevant whether [defend­
ant] was also motivated by reasons which would not themselves constitute valid 
grounds for termination of the contract."), affd, 25 F.3d 105 (2d. Cir. 1994). 
133. See, e.g., UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., 525 So. 2d 
746, 747 (Miss. 1987) (illustrating bad faith dispute). In UHS-Qualicare, the plain­
tiff was both a 50% owner and the management company of the defendant hospi­
tal. [d. When the plaintiff, in its capacity of manager, raised the daily rate for the 
hospital without approval of the hospital board, the hospital terminated plaintiffs 
management contract, claiming material breach. [d. at 748-49. This termination 
occurred after the other 50% owner had gained control of the board. [d. at 749. 
The court refused to uphold the finding of material breach and thus the defend­
ant's right to termination, concluding that the defendant always reserved the 
power to override the rate increase. [d. at 757. The court, concluding that the 
defendant could not assert the rate increases as a material breach when it had the 
power to reverse those increases, said: "Today's horse ... was completely subject to 
the reins and whip of its master who was obligated to at least try to exercise its 
authority before declaring termination." [d. The court found it particularly telling 
that defendant had still not rolled back the hospital's rates after terminating plain­
tiff as evidence of the insincerity of defendant's claim of material breach. [d.; see 
also Kershentsev v. Mascotte Prods., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 339, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(holding that booking agent's contract with ballet troupe was materially breached 
by: agent's failure to keep adequate records, lying, refusal to render accounting, 
failure to procure bookings, loss offunds and improper incorporation), rev'd, 981 
F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1992). 
134. See, e.g., Marschall, supra note 104, at 734 (arguing that any party who 
commits "willful breach" of contract should be subject to punitive damages). Pro-
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nations of material breach,135 the law generally treats contract 
breach as an amoral matter with economic consequences for which 
there should be compensation, but not punishment.136 If, instead, 
the courts focused on the character of the breach and determined 
rights and remedies accordingly, the law might be able to en­
courage good faith conduct and independent resolution of con­
tract disputes. 
fessor Marschall would define a "willful breach" as "a knowing breach by a party 
not legally excused from performing, which is made for any primary purpose other 
than to confer a benefit on the aggrieved party." Id. at 733; see also Frank]. Cavico, 
Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled Approach, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 
357, 375 (1990) ("The orthodox rule [of compensatory damages for breach of 
contract], which continually downplays or disregards the wrongfulness of the 
breaching party's conduct regardless of how outrageously immoral, offends one's 
sense of fairness and justice and engenders disrespect for the law."). 
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (defining one factor 
to be used to determine whether material failure has occurred is "the extent to 
which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports 
with standards of good faith and fair dealing"). This factor has led courts to place 
some weight on the character of the breaching party's conduct in determining 
material breach and substantial performance. See Malone v. United States, 849 
F.2d 1441, 1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (considering government's bad faith factor in 
finding that it had materially breached contract with painter where government 
had failed to notify painter that work was unsatisfactory until 70% of work was 
completed and had otherwise misled painter into believing work was approved); 
Eastbourne, 815 F. Supp. at 743 (upholding defendant's termination of contract 
with plaintiff where plaintiff unable to assert substantial performance, in part due 
to finding that its breach "was neither unintentional nor trivial, but clearly a willful 
breach ofa material term of the contract"); Vincenzi v. Cerro, 442 A.2d 1352, 1354 
(Conn. 1982) (reasoning that willfulness not solely determinative, but just one fac­
tor to be weighed in determining whether contractor had substantially performed 
and was therefore entitled to recover under contract); RJ. Berke & Co. v.J.P. Grif­
fin, Inc., 367 A.2d 583, 586 (N.H. 1976) (holding that although willful breacher 
ordinarily denied even quantum meruit recovery, award to subcontractor upheld 
based on finding of no bad faith on its part); Kiriakides v. United Artists Commu­
nications, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 364, 367 (S.C. 1994) (considering tenant's good faith in 
immediately tendering amount due upon receiving actual notice of rent increase 
as factor in finding no material breach of lease); see also Andersen, supra note 54, at 
1124-28 (discussing willful breach as relevant factor to issue of materiality and in­
terest in future performance); Marschall, supra note 104, at 736 (noting that will­
fulness factor pervades Second Restatement, despite some American Law Institute 
support for efficient breach). 
Similarly, in the parallel doctrine of substantial performance, weight is some­
times placed on the willfulness of the breach in determining if the breaching party 
has failed to perform substantially. See 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 707, at 329 
(noting that when cases deny recovery to plaintiff on ground that breach was will­
ful, it is "probable that his breach was actually such as to prevent his performance 
from being 'substantial'" ); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.12, at 418 (explaining 
that concept of substantial forfeiture "evolved in response to the risk of foreiture"); 
Farber, supra note 104, at 1470-73 (discussing willfulness element of substantial 
performance). For a discussion of the doctrine of substantial performance, see 
supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
136. For a discussion of the compensatory nature of contract law, see supra 
note 104 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, if we assume that a dispute arises like that in Jacob & 
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,137 when determining material breach by the 
Contractor, the court should first weigh the harm to the two par­
ties: Is the harm to Owner's reasonable expectations greater than 
the harm to Contractor if Owner terminates the contract? If one 
assumes that Contractor had used an equivalent pipe, then it would 
seem that the harm to Owner should be weighed less heavily than 
the harm to Contractor, assuming Contractor has not been paid. 
On the other hand, if the pipe used was not equivalent, then the 
balance of harms might tip the other way. In many cases, the harm 
to the parties may be fairly closely balanced. 
Having identified the relative balance of harms, the court 
should then consider the factor of good faith and add that to the 
scale before deciding if the Contractor has committed a material 
breach. Although the good faith of a breaching party may not be 
enough to counterbalance any substantial harm to the nonbreach­
ing party, it will playa critical role in those cases where the harm to 
the parties is more or less balanced. Thus, in those cases where 
each party will suffer similarly significant harm, if the other party 
does not complete its performance of the contract, the relative 
good faith of those parties will be the deciding factor for the courts 
to rely on in determining material breach and the appropriate out­
come and remedies. 
When both parties are operating in good faith, the law should 
act to encourage these parties to work out the matter among them­
selves by finding no material breach and thus refusing to sanction 
the termination of the contract by the nonbreaching party. The 
court should recognize the concerns each party may have as it ne­
gotiates with each other and not simply deny protection to the first 
breacher. 
For example, if Contractor honestly believed that he was al­
lowed to use the pipe installed and Owner honestly believed other­
wise and she is honestly concerned about Contractor's future 
performance, there is a reasonable likelihood that these two parties 
can work out their differences independently. Both parties still can 
see some benefit from working together and both are operating 
137. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (known as the "Reading Pipe Case"). InJacob 
& Youngs. the plaintiff built a country residence for defendant. [d. at 890. The 
contract called for the use of "standard pipe" of "Reading manufacture." [d. The 
plaintiff used pipe that was not manufactured by Reading. [d. The court ruled 
that the omission was not willful and that replacement of the pipe would be ex­
tremelyexpensive. [d. The court thus found that the use of non-Reading pipe was 
insignificant. [d. 
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honestly and in good faith. Each, however, may have legitimate 
worries. Contractor may have two concerns: one, whether he will 
be paid for the work already done if he breaks off the relationship; 
and two, whether he will be paid for any future work if he continues 
working. Owner similarly will have two types of concerns: one, 
whether Contractor will perform the rest of the work to Owner's 
satisfaction; and two, whether there will be some correction of or 
compensation for the error already committed. I38 
As described by Professor Andersen, each party will be con­
cerned about both the risks of future performance and the desire 
for compensation for past performance. I39 Professor Andersen ar­
gued that a party's right to suspend performance should be deter­
mined on the basis of the party's concerns for future 
performance. I4O Although it is easier to sympathize with a party's 
desire to suspend performance when that party has serious con­
cerns about the other's future performance, in good faith disputes, 
both parties may have legitimate concerns about the other's future 
performance. It seems arbitrary and wasteful to focus only on who 
breached first and to allow for termination by the nonbreaching 
party as the parties may still be able to work together. 
138. Many have commented on the role that nonlegal factors play in deter­
ring breach and facilitating resolution of disputes. There is much sociological and 
economic literature on the subject of nonlegal factors that encourage parties to 
honor commitments. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Rela­
tionships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373, nn.59-82 (1990) (discussing the reasons for and 
consequences of commercial parties often relying on such nonlegal sanctions in­
stead of legally enforceable agreements). Professor Charny describes three gen­
eral categories of nonlegal sanctions that discourage breach of commitment: the 
loss of relationship-specific prospective advantages, such as future dealings with 
the other party or collateral posted as security; the injury to reputation among 
other market participants; and the damage to psychic and social goods, such as 
self-esteem and social acceptance. /d. at 392-97. Professor Farnsworth theorized 
that nonlegal sanctions are more effective in relationships that are reversible, i.e., 
relationships where the parties realize that each could be in the other's position, 
e.g., in market transactions between equals. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Prom­
ise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 576, 604-05 (1969). He 
further pointed out that such nonlegal sanctions are more effective in continuing 
relationships, as opposed to one-shot deals. Id.; see also Addison Mueller, Contract 
Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 833, 836 (noting that "it 
is nonlegal sanctions, not 'the law,' that keep contracts from being breached in 
most standard dealings between parties"); Weintraub, supra note 104, at 20 (find­
ing in survey researching actual contract practice, that "[w]hen a dispute arises, 
parties with a history of mutually beneficial dealings are less likely to resort to 
litigation than are strangers" (footnote omitted». 
139. See Andersen, supra note 54, at 1092 (discussing expectation interests of 
contracting parties). 
140. Id. at 1092, 1096-1101. For a further discussion of Professor Andersen's 
views, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
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In this circumstance, the court should find no material breach. 
The law should seek to encourage these parties to negotiate rather 
than to allow one party'to suspend performance simply because the 
other party breached first. Some have argued that the best way for 
the law to facilitate such negotiations is to deny monetary relief to 
either party if the dispute ends in litigation. Instead, these scholars 
argue, the courts should order specific performance.141 By doing 
so, the court will require the parties to reconsider their positions 
and either perform as originally agreed or modify the agreement to 
fit their changed perceptions and circumstances. 
This solution may work satisfactorily with respect to two good 
faith parties. The knowledge that if the matter goes to litigation 
they will simply be ordered to perform may keep these parties at 
the negotiating table. Thus, if the balance of harms is relatively 
close and the parties are operating in good faith, neither party 
should be entitled to suspend or terminate the contract. In other 
words, no material breach should be found in these cases. 
Such an approach, however, may be less effective if one party is 
not acting in good faith. When there is a bad faith breach on the 
part of one party, there may be little the law can do to encourage a 
fair independent settlement. By definition, that party is seeking to 
avoid its contractual obligations. Rather than treating such a 
breach as "acceptable" and awarding only compensatory damages 
to the nonbreaching party, the law's goal should be to deter parties 
from bad faith breaches by penalizing the breaching party. Thus, if 
a party is found to have breached in bad faith and the harm to the 
nonbreaching party outweighs the harm to the breaching party if 
the contract is terminated, that breach should be considered mate­
rial. The court should then deny the breaching party any remedy, 
including restitution for work done, and stJ.ould moreover hold that 
party liable to the other party for its expectation damages. 
141. See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: 
The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE LJ. 49, 70 ("The availability of the remedy 
of specific performance might permit achievement of the desired result without 
the expense of court action by encouraging one contemplating breach to bargain 
instead to adjust his duties."); Linzer, supra note 104, at 138 ("By holding the par­
ties to their bargain, but permitting them to negotiate out, specific performance 
lets no outsiders substitute their values for those of the parties. Except in the most 
fungible of commercial transactions, courts should encourage this self-regulating 
and thus more efficient method of valuation and dispute resolution."); Macneil, 
supra note 104, at 959 (asserting that specific performance is more likely to en­
courage "consultation and mutually beneficial agreement," leading to more effi­
cient result overall). 
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For example, if Contractor is found to be operating in bad 
faith by deliberately using the wrong pipe to save expenses, and the 
harm to the Owner outweighs or equals the harm to Contractor 
from termination of the contract, then Contractor has committed a 
material breach.142 Owner should then be able to recover her dam­
ages and to suspend performance, based on her good faith con­
cerns about Contractor's future performance. These damages 
should include the increased cost of completing the job and any 
additional expenses incurred. To the extent that Owner benefits 
from the work Contractor had already done, that benefit will be 
recognized by awarding only the increase in the cost of completion 
to the Owner as damages. Contractor, however, will have no sepa­
rate claim for restitution. Thus, by penalizing the bad faith party 
and rewarding the good faith party in such disputes, the law can 
discourage bad faith breaches and perhaps reduce the likelihood of 
such disputes. 
Similarly, the nonbreaching party may be seeking a discharge 
from its obligations by relying in bad faith on the other party's de­
fective performance. Thus, if, for example, Contractor breaches in 
good faith by mistakenly using the wrong pipe, and Owner is found 
to be using the pipe problem in bad faith to extract concessions 
from Contractor or to avoid the contract completely, a court should 
not consider the Contractor's breach material. Here, Contractor 
has not acted in bad faith and the harm to Owner was not signifi­
cant and did not actually raise legitimate concerns about future 
performance. Thus, Owner had no right to terminate, and by fail­
ing to perform in bad faith, should be liable to Contractor for dam­
ages. Owner should be liable to Contractor for any lost profit that 
Contractor had expected to make on the contract, less any costs 
Contractor has avoided by the termination of the contract. The 
court should also include any additional costs Contractor has in­
curred as a result of the dispute in the damages Contractor may 
recover from Owner. It should not matter that Contractor failed to 
perform first, if his nonperformance was in good faith.143 
142. See Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891 (discussing breach). 
143. In Bernstein v. Nemeyer, 570 A.2d 164 (Conn. 1990), the Connecticut 
Supreme Court took an approach which reflects- these concerns. Plaintiffs had 
entered into a limited partnership agreement with defendants which all parties 
knew involved substantial financial risk. [d. at 165. As part of the agreement, de­
fendants promised to loan money to the partnership to cover any negative cash 
flow. [d. at 165-66. The properties in which the partnership had invested failed to 
appreciate and eventually the mortgagees foreclosed on the properties. [d. at 166. 
All the parties lost their investment. [d. Defendants had failed to perform the 
negative cash flow guarantee completely and plaintiffs sued, alleging material 
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If both parties are failing to perform for bad faith reasons, the 
courts should treat the parties as equally responsible for the dis­
pute. The appropriate remedy is then to place both parties in a 
position where both lose the benefits of the contract. If, for exam­
ple, in our pipe hypothetical, Contractor used the wrong pipe in 
bad faith to save money and Owner asserted the use of the wrong 
pipe pretextually to stop payments to Contractor when, in fact, the 
brand of pipe did not matter to her, then both parties were acting 
in bad faith. Neither party should be "entitled" to suspend or ter­
minate the contract because both are responsible for the break­
down in contractual relations. Thus, no material breach should be 
found. 
Instead, if some of the work had been done by Contractor, and 
some of the price had been paid by Owner, then Owner should 
fully pay for the work done but only at the actual cost to Contractor. 
Contractor should not be able to recover any lost profits or other 
reliance damages. Owner should not be entitled to recover for 
completion costs or its reliance damages. By limiting the available 
remedies, the court may be placing the parties where they would 
have been if they could have successfully settled the matter them­
selves. If contracting parties are aware of these limited remedies, 
this may deter bad faith breaches or, at least, increase the incentives 
for the parties to work the matter out by themselves. 
breach and seeking rescission and restitution of the money invested in the partner­
ship. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that although the breach was mate­
rial because of the importance of the guaranty, the defendants had not acted in 
bad faith and had not been unjustly enriched by that breach. Id. at 170. Given the 
character of the breach as distinguished from its materiality, the court concluded 
that the defendants were not liable to the plaintiffs for restitution and that the 
material breach had merely discharged the plaintiff's contractual obligation. Id. at 
168-69. Thus, the court recognized that remedies should be adjusted to reflect the 
character of a breach, not simply its materiality. Id. at 168-70; see also Milner Ho­
tels, Inc. v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 822 F. Supp. 341, 347 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (deter­
mining that party who commits material breach is not entitled to recover rent 
payment where other party vacated premises as result of such breach), aff'd, 19 
F.3d 1429 (4th Cir. 1994); Argentinis v. Gould, 592 A.2d 378,381-82 (Conn. 1991) 
(holding that where contractor did not substantially perform contract to build 
house, owner is entitled to recover compensatory damages to cover costs of com­
pletion and repairs less any unpaid portion of contract price; however, contractor 
cannot sue for unpaid contract price if it has not substantially performed); RJ. 
Berke & Co. v. J.P. Griffin, Inc., 367 A.2d 583, 586-87 (N.H. 1976) (upholding 
quantum meruit recovery to subcontractor who had not substantially performed 
where both parties to construction contract had materially breached); Kiriakides v. 
United Artists Communications, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 364, 367 (S.C. 1994) (holding 
that breach not material where lessee failed to pay increase in rent due to honest 
misunderstanding and immediately attempted to cure when notified, in part due 
to good faith oflessee). 
HeinOnline -- 42 Vill. L. Rev. 107 1997
 
108 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 65 
It is, of course, impossible to predict whether a change in the 
application of legal doctrine will effect a change in human behav­
ior. Even if this modification does not alter such behavior, it will at 
least clarify the law and provide courts and parties with a better 
understanding of how to make determinations of material breach. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under current law, the doctrine of material breach is applied 
by the courts in a muddled, unfocused way. The courts do not gen­
erally explain the basis of their decisions, nor do they provide any 
clear application of the Second Restatement factors for deterrrlin­
ing material breach. As a result, the decisions often seem unrea­
soned, and the focus on who breached first leaves parties exposed 
to uncertainty and the risk of liability, if they suspend or terminate 
performance in response to what they guess is a material breach by 
the other party.l44 
There is little question that the public interest would be greatly 
served if the law clarified the doctrine of material breach. Thus, 
when focusing on the "materiality" of a particular failure to per­
form, courts should eschew the confused multifactor balancing test 
of the Second Restatement and instead focus, as Judge Cardozo 
did, on the degree of harm caused by the breach to the reasonable 
expectations of the nonbreaching party and on the degree of harm 
that the breaching party would experience if the court excused the 
other party from performing.145 This balance of harms should then 
be evaluated most carefully in light of the question of good faith. 
The courts should focus on the character of the conduct, that is, 
the motivation and state of mind of the parties. 146 
In contract disputes where the balance of harms is close and 
the parties are all operating in good faith, courts should encourage 
the parties to resolve their dispute by finding no material breach 
and ordering specific performance of the contract. 147 On the other 
hand, where the harm to the nonbreaching party significantly out­
weighs the risk of harm to the breaching party, or where the 
breaching party is acting in bad faith, that breach should be consid-
144. For a discussion of the facts of the hypothetical, see supra note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
145. See generally Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 889 (highlighting Judge Car­
dozo's views). 
146. See Rosett, supra note 1, at 1086 (discussing that traditional legal theories 
focus on who breached first). 
147. See Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 560 (discussing 
that expectations of parties is best way to resolve problems of breach). 
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ered material and the nonbreaching party should be fully compen­
sated based on its expectation interest.148 If both parties are acting 
in bad faith, then no material breach should be found, and both 
parties should be denied the benefits of the contract. 149 
By providing a more focused framework for determining mate­
rial breach and by structuring contract law remedies to deter bad 
faith breaches, the law may more successfully promote good faith 
contract performance and independent resolution of contract dis­
putes. At the very least, it will promote a better understanding of 
the law by parties and more honest and lucid decision-making by 
the courts. 
148. For a discussion of specific performance and its role in material breach, 
see supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
149. For a discussion of the notion of deterring willful breaches, see supra 
note 134 and accompanying text. 
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